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SMOKING, DRINKING, AND BINGE DRINKING: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE 
ROLE OF PRICE ON CONSUMPTION BY HIGH SCHOOL SENIORS 
by 
Jorge L. Medina 
 
Advisor: Professor Michael Grossman 
In this study, I estimate time-series demand functions using Ordinary Least Squares in order 
to examine the effects of real cigarette and alcohol prices on their respective consumption. My 
targeted population is high school seniors in the United States. The data I use come from 
Monitoring the Future, The Tax Burden on Tobacco, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Using the 
Ordinary Least Squares real price coefficients, I evaluate how much of the observed change in 
consumption is explained by the observed change in real price during a particular period of time 
between 1976 and 2008. Then, I repeat the same calculations for subsamples of male, female, white, 
and nonwhite high school seniors. Moreover, I incorporate a risk variable measuring whether or not 
subjects believe there is a great risk of harm when consuming cigarettes or alcohol in moderate or 
excessive quantities. 
Among high school seniors, my findings reveal that 73 percent of the observed decrease in 
cigarette consumption during 1997-2008, 28 percent of the observed decrease in alcohol 
consumption during 1989-1992, and 70 percent of the observed decrease in excessive alcohol 
consumption also during 1989-1992 are explained by increments in their respective real prices. The 
percentage of change in cigarette, alcohol, and excessive alcohol consumption explained by changes 
in their respective real prices remain substantial even after controlling for risk perceptions associated 
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with these activities. Furthermore, greater awareness of the risks associated with smoking, drinking, 
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Cigarette smoking is one of the most preventable causes of lung cancer deaths, heart disease-
related deaths, and other respiratory illnesses. According to the United States Department of Health 
and Human Services (1989, 1998), tobacco products are linked to more deaths than any other 
product. Cigarettes, which account for 95 percent of tobacco product sales in the Unites States, are 
recognized as the cause of approximately one-fifth of the deaths per year in the United States 
(Chaloupka and Warner 2000). Alcohol consumption has health and socioeconomic consequences 
that are also far from trivial. Cook and Moore (2000) point out concerns associated to excessive 
alcohol consumption such as crime and early death. These concerns have stimulated public and 
government support to treat alcohol and tobacco different than other commodities. 
In order to deter the consumption of cigarettes and alcohol, the United States Government 
set minimum legal smoking and drinking ages, restricted smoking in confined public areas 
(workplaces, schools, etc.), sternly punished driving under the influence of alcohol, and applied high 
excise taxes to these commodities. Two particular reasons that motivated these actions are the 
addictive characteristic of smoking cigarettes and drinking alcoholic beverages and the negative 
externalities that these two activities impose on bystanders.  
Current literature in the field of economics of substance abuse shows new theories that 
predict that addictive goods (such as cigarettes and alcohol) should be more sensitive to price 
changes than previously believed. For example, Becker and Murphy (1988) propose a model of 
rational addiction where they state that for rational (farsighted) individuals, the demand for addictive 
goods might not be perfectly inelastic, as it is commonly assumed. They state that the quantity 
demanded of addictive goods might respond to changes in their prices and that the cross-price 
elasticity of quantities of addictive goods consumed in different periods is negative. Becker, 
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Grossman, and Murphy (1994) do an empirical test on this model of rational addiction and find that 
the cross-price elasticity of quantities consumed in different periods is indeed negative. They also 
find that long-run responses exceed short-run responses, which makes the long-run increase in tax 
revenue from an increase in the Federal excise tax on cigarettes considerably smaller than the short-
run increase. 
In addition to the negative health consequences of smoking cigarettes, the social cost of 
cigarette consumption due to the negative externalities related to this activity is a public health 
concern. Public health advocates demand that people who consume cigarettes and alcohol pay the 
full price of these commodities. That is, people who consume cigarettes and alcohol should pay a 
price that reflects the harm imposed on bystanders (or external costs) in addition to the harm 
imposed on the consumer of these goods (or internal costs). However, as it is usually the case for 
any other good with a negative consumption externality, determining the full price for cigarettes and 
alcohol is not an easy task. 
Additional public health concerns are the severe consequences of alcohol consumption. For 
instance, excessive alcohol consumption has been linked to lost productivity, disability, early death, 
crime, neglect of family responsibilities, personality deterioration, and other problems (Cook and 
Moore 2000). Economists have analyzed positive and negative consequences borne by those who 
consume alcoholic beverages and those around them. Researchers at the United States Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) found more than a 50 percent increase in reports of alcohol-
impaired driving since 1994 (Shults, Kresnow, and Lee 2009). Additionally, the CDC associated 
alcohol with 4.9 percent of all the deaths in 1987 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1990). 
As highlighted by Cook and Moore (2000), even though these estimates show that alcohol 
consumption is less menacing than cigarette consumption, alcohol consumption is a greater problem 
than drug abuse. Two benefits of alcohol consumption are the prevention of coronary heart disease 
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when consumed in moderation (Camargo et al. 1997; Criqui et al. 1987; Klatsky, Armstrong, and 
Friedman 1990; Shaper, Wannamethee, and Walker 1988; Stampfer et al. 1988; Yano, Rhoads, and 
Kagan 1977) and its role as an acceptable substitute for uncontaminated beverages in places where 
drinking water is polluted (Vallee 1998). 
Cook and Moore (2000) divide the consequences of alcohol consumption in short-term 
consequences of excessive alcohol consumption (traffic crashes, alcohol overdose, drowning, and 
intentional violence) and long-term consequences of persistent excessive alcohol consumption 
(damage to the liver and other organs, impaired cognition and immune-system function, and alcohol 
dependence). Furthermore, alcohol consumption during pregnancy may impair the child’s healthy 
development (Larkby and Day 1997). Some of these consequences are clear evidence that the 
negative externalities related to alcohol consumption are an unquestionable public health concern. 
Taxation, an approach taken by the United States to decrease cigarette and alcohol 
consumption, increases the nominal price of cigarettes and alcoholic beverages. It is also one of the 
most efficient ways to alter nominal cigarette and alcohol prices. As Grossman, Chaloupka, Saffer, 
and Laixuthai (1994) point out, the administrative and enforcement costs of policies that curb 
people’s consumption of cigarettes and alcohol other than taxation are possibly more expensive. For 
this reason and Becker and Murphy’s (1988) model of rational addiction, I pay particular attention to 
the response in cigarette and alcohol consumption due to changes in cigarette and alcohol prices. 
This response to price is crucial to determine an effective tax policy for cigarettes and alcohol to 
price them at their full price (money price plus external and internal costs). If changes in cigarette 
and alcohol prices explain a significant fraction of the changes in their consumption, then the United 




In this study, I examine three particular outcomes: cigarette smoking, moderate alcohol 
consumption, and excessive alcohol consumption, which I will also refer to as smoking, drinking, 
and binge drinking, respectively. I estimate time-series demand functions for smoking, drinking, and 
binge drinking using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Then, I use these OLS price coefficients to 
calculate the price elasticities of demand for smoking, drinking, and binge drinking evaluated at the 
sample mean levels. Furthermore, I estimate these time-series demand functions for smoking, 
drinking, and binge drinking in a double log functional form in order to obtain price coefficients that 
represent price elasticities of demand with respect to the money price.1 Then, I compare these new 
price elasticity estimates with the price elasticities evaluated at the sample mean levels. 
Besides emphasizing the role of price on smoking, drinking, and binge drinking, I focus on 
high school seniors because the consumption of cigarettes and alcohol are habits that start 
developing at this age (Grossman et al. 1994) and individuals at this age are more responsive to price 
changes than adults (Gruber and Zinman 2000). Particularly, Lewit et al. (1981) point out that due to 
the addictive nature of smoking, adult smokers are less likely to adjust quickly to changes in the price 
of cigarettes than young smokers because young smokers have been smoking for less time. 
Furthermore, they point out that peer behavior is much more relevant among young smokers than 
adults. Bauman and Ennett (1996) reaffirm the central role of peer pressure in youth alcohol 
consumption. Grossman and Chaloupka (1997) point out two additional reasons to focus on young 
smokers. First, they indicate that the fraction of disposable income a young smoker spends on 
cigarettes is probably higher than the fraction of disposable income spent by an adult smoker. 
Second, they indicate that younger individuals are more present-oriented. Also, the habit-forming 
nature of alcohol consumption and its relevance in social gatherings are major reasons to focus on 
alcohol consumption among high school seniors. 
                                                 
1 See Appendix. 
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A novel aspect in my study is the inclusion of a variable that measures high school seniors’ 
perceptions of the risk of harm associated with smoking, drinking, and binge drinking. This risk 
variable measures the percentage of high school seniors who consider smoking, drinking, or binge 
drinking an activity of great risk. In addition to serving as a control for the risk perceptions of 
consumers, this risk variable allows me to tests the explanatory power of real price on consumption. 
When estimating the demand functions for smoking, drinking, and binge drinking, I also 
estimate separate demand functions for subsamples of male, female, white, and non-white high 
school seniors in order to obtain the effects of real prices on the consumption of cigarettes and 
alcohol for these particular subgroups. Furthermore, I estimate demand functions for subsamples 
composed of those who consider smoking, drinking, or binge drinking a great risk and those who do 
not. Then, I evaluate the effect of price on consumption for these two particular subgroups. 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature 
review. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the data and model specification, respectively. Section 5 presents 
the empirical results for cigarette, alcohol, and excessive alcohol consumption for the whole sample 
and male, female, white, and nonwhite subsamples. I also present results obtained when the whole 
sample and subsamples are separated into those who consider smoking, drinking, or binge drinking 
a great risk and those who do not. Section 6 concludes with an evaluation of the effect of real 
cigarette and alcohol prices on cigarette, alcohol, and excessive alcohol consumption. This section 
also discusses how the effect of price on consumption changes when high school seniors are more 
aware of the risks associated with smoking, drinking, or binge drinking.  
6 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The health consequences of cigarette and alcohol consumption have received significant 
scientific attention. The first studies that linked smoking with lung cancer were published in the 
1950’s (Doll and Hill 1954, 1956; Hammond and Horn 1958b, 1958a; Wynder and Graham 1950). 
Today, lung cancer is recognized as the reason for 30 percent of all cancer deaths in the United 
States (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1989). Moreover, cigarette smoking has 
been recognized as the leading cause for approximately 90 percent of lung cancer deaths in the 
United States (Chaloupka and Warner 2000) and one of the main reasons for heart disease. 
In the case of alcohol consumption, drinking by youths has gotten a lot of attention. 
Grossman et al. (1994) points out that compared to adults, youths are more prone to binge drinking 
because they discount their future more heavily, and they are also involved in more motor-vehicle 
accidents and violent crimes. Cook and Moore (1993) point out that alcohol consumption is a habit-
forming activity, and that it sets the pattern for future consumption among youths. They also 
mention negative consequences of alcohol consumption for human capital and family formation. A 
number of studies using different data sets conclude that the incidences of moderate and excessive 
alcohol consumption are related to price and the legal minimum drinking age (Grossman et al. 1994). 
Chaloupka and Wechsler (1996), however, found that the price of beer does not have a discernable 
effect on alcohol consumption among male college students. 
When it comes to public health, one of the biggest concerns is the chronic inhalation of 
environmental tobacco smoke, which causes lung cancer in nonsmokers as well as other diseases in 
the children of smokers (Environmental Protection Agency 1994). According to Glantz and Parmley 
(1995), environmental tobacco smoke might be responsible for tens of thousands of heart disease-
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related deaths per year. Another public health concern is the motor-vehicle accidents involving 
alcohol impaired drivers and intentional violence. 
Conventional studies of cigarette demand show price elasticity of demand estimates that fall 
in a range from -0.5 to -0.3 (Chaloupka and Warner 2000). Quasi-experimental studies based on 
aggregate data that compared changes in cigarette consumption in states that increased the taxes on 
cigarettes and those that did not yield price elasticities of demand that range from -0.56 to -0.17 
(Baltagi and Goel 1987; Peterson et al. 1992). Some of the difficulties in studies using time-series 
data involve high correlations among some the key explanatory variables and price, sensitivity of the 
estimates of the effect of cigarette price on cigarette consumption, and multicollinearity and unstable 
estimates of the parameters of interest due to including highly correlated variables. Numerous 
studies using sophisticated econometric techniques have addressed these issues (Barnett, Keeler, and 
Hu 1995; Flewelling et al. 1992; Keeler et al. 1996; Seldon and Boyd 1991; Simonich 1991; Sung, Hu, 
and Keeler 1994) and found estimates for the price elasticity of demand within a narrow range 
centered on -0.4. 
Price elasticity of demand estimates for alcohol consumption vary over time, place, data set, 
and estimation method. However, price elasticities of demand for alcohol are negative in almost 
every case (Cook and Moore 2000). Cook and Moore (2000) point out econometric studies that 
estimate price elasticities of demand for beer, wine, and spirits differ widely and in some instances, 
they are not negative. Furthermore, Clements et al (1997) calculate price elasticities of demand for 
Australia, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Using a 
system of demand equations based on aggregate data, they find average price elasticities of demand 






I use national time-series data to estimate time-series demand functions for smoking, 
drinking, and binge drinking. Two benefits of using national-level data to estimate the effects of 
price on consumption are that they allow me to analyze a continuous period of time including the 
most recent data, and they also allow me to observe whether or not changes in real cigarette and 
alcohol prices throughout time had the expected effect on their respective consumption levels. The 
most prominent limitations of these time-series data are that there are a small number of 
observations and the variables used in my model are correlated. 
Time-series data on yearly national nominal cigarette prices from 1976 to 2008 are obtained 
from The Tax Burden on Tobacco by Orzechowski and Walker (2008).2 National time-series data on the 
yearly nominal prices of alcoholic beverages such as beer, wine, and spirits from 1976 to 2008 are 
taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The Consumer Price Index3 (used to calculate real 
prices) is also taken from the BLS. 
Figure 1 shows the real prices of cigarettes, beer, wine, and spirits from 1976 to 2008. This 
period includes most of the anti-smoking campaign in the United States, which started with the first 
Surgeon General’s Report on Smoking and Health in 1964. It also includes campaigns to reduce 
deaths from motor vehicles accidents by discouraging alcohol abuse (out-reach programs on college 
campuses and “zero tolerance” laws, for example). In Figure 1, we see a somewhat steady increase in 
the real cigarette price. Figure 1 also shows that the real cigarette price dropped by 14 percent from 
1976 to 1980 and rose by 88 percent from 1980 to 1992. This significant increase in the real cigarette 
                                                 
2 Nominal prices for cigarettes are the weighted average (median) price per package for all states as of 
November of year 𝑡. Starting in 1990, generic brands are not included in the average calculation. Moreover, 
average prices do not include all the cigarette taxes that are imposed by one or more municipalities in six out 
of the 50 states plus D.C. Price does include state sales taxes, where applicable. 
 
3 Not seasonally adjusted. 
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price is due, in part, to the increases in Federal excise tax rates on cigarettes.4 In 1993, Philip Morris 
Companies cut the nominal price of a pack of Marlboro cigarettes by 40 cents as a strategy against 
generic brand cigarettes, which were just introduced into the market. This action was hastily 
followed by its competitors, resulting in the 12 percent decrease in the real price for cigarettes from 
1992 to 1997. A 72 percent increase in the real cigarette price, the second highest increase in the real 
cigarette price since 1976, happened from 1997 to 2002. This time, this significant increase in the 
real cigarette price was due to a Federal excise tax rate increase5 and also due to a number of state 
tax increases. Additionally, this hike in the real cigarette price reflects the Master Settlement 
Agreement, which is the settlement of lawsuits filed by 46 state attorneys general against cigarette 
companies to recover Medicaid funds spent treating smoking-related diseases (Grossman 2004). 
After 2002, the real price of cigarettes decreased by 4 percent until 2006 and then increased by 3 
percent, which almost leaves the real price of cigarettes unchanged. 
Figure 1 also shows a steady decline in the real price of alcoholic beverages such as beer, 
wine, and spirits. Before Federal tax rates increased for these three goods in 1991, the real prices of 
beer, wine, and spirits decreased by 20, 28, and 30 percent, respectively. After this tax increase, real 
prices decreased again by 13 percent for beer, 18 percent for wine, and 16 percent for spirits. 
The data on consumption of cigarettes, beer, wine, and spirits came from Monitoring the 
Future (MTF), a project conducted by the Institute of Social Research of the University of Michigan. 
The MTF project provides long and consistent time-series data on the behavior of students 
regarding their consumption of cigarettes and alcohol. It consists of cross-sectional yearly surveys 
answered by secondary school students since 1976. A concern with self-reported consumption of 
                                                 
4There was an increase of 16 cents per pack of cigarettes in 1983 and an increase of 20 cents per pack of 
cigarettes in 1991. 
 
5There was an increase of 34 cents per pack of cigarettes in 2000 and an increase of 39 cents per pack of 
cigarettes in 2002. 
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alcohol is that respondents are likely to understate actual consumption. Compared to the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), which is perhaps the most complete panel data set based on 
youths, the MTF project generated much higher estimates of drinking and binge drinking incidences 
(Cook and Moore 2000). One plausible explanation is that the MTF surveys were answered in the 
classroom, whereas the NLSY surveys were answered at home. 
In the MTF project, students answer questions such as “how frequently have you smoked 
cigarettes during the past thirty days?,” “on how many occasions have you had alcoholic beverages 
to drink (more than a few sips) during the last twelve months?,” and “in the last two weeks, how 
many times have you had five or more drinks6 in a row?” The MTF project uses the answers to 
these questions to measure smoking, drinking, and binge drinking participation, respectively. I use 
these participation measures among high school seniors to create dummy variables indicating those 
who smoked cigarettes in the past thirty days (even if it was less than one cigarette a day), consumed 
an alcoholic beverage at least once in the past twelve months, or consumed five or more drinks in a 
row on at least one day in the past two weeks. Then, I use these dummy variables to calculate the 
annual fraction of high school seniors that engaged in smoking, drinking, and binge drinking 
activities.7 Finally, I use these fractions to express the yearly percentages of high school seniors who 
smoked cigarettes in the past thirty days (even if it is less than one cigarette a day), consumed an 
alcoholic beverage at least once in the past twelve months, or had five or more drinks in a row on at 
least one day in the past two weeks. When estimating the times-series demand functions for smoking, 
drinking, or binge drinking, these yearly percentages (or yearly participation rates) represent the 
dependent variables (consumption), and they are labeled smoking, drinking, and binge drinking, 
respectively. 
                                                 
6 A drink is a bottle of beer, a glass of wine, a wine cooler, a shot glass of liquor, or a mixed drink. 
 
7 This calculation is the weighted average of individual participation measured by the dummy variables. The 
weights are sampling weights provided by the MTF project. 
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Figure 2 shows these yearly participation rates for smoking, drinking, and binge drinking 
from 1976 to 2008 among high school seniors. In Figure 2, we can see a decrease in smoking, 
drinking, and binge drinking participation of 47, 24, and 33 percent, respectively, from 1976 to 2008. 
Smoking participation, which has the largest decrease, follows through with the significant increase 
in the real cigarette price. However, drinking and binge drinking participation do not show such a 
strong correlation with their respective real prices. It is important to remember, however, that 
nominal prices were not the only tool used to reduce the consumption of cigarettes and alcohol. 
Anti-smoking and anti-drinking campaigns also had an effect on the consumption of these 
substances. 
The MTF project also provides data on the risk perceptions of consuming cigarettes and 
alcohol among high school seniors, which is also a relevant determinant of the consumption of these 
goods. In the MTF surveys, the respondents answer questions such as “how much do you think 
people risk harming themselves if they smoke one or more packs of cigarettes per day?,” “how 
much do you think people risk harming themselves if they take one or two drinks nearly every day?,” 
and “how much do you think people risk harming themselves if they take five or more drinks once 
or twice each weekend?” I use the MTF data on risk perceptions to calculate the yearly percentage of 
high school seniors who consider smoking, drinking, and binge drinking, respectively, a great risk in 
a similar manner as I calculate the yearly participation rates for smoking, drinking, and binge 
drinking. When constructing the dummy variables for risk perceptions, these dummy variables 
equaled one only if the respondent the activity in discussion a great risk. Figure 3 shows these 
percentages from 1976 to 2008. 
Figure 3 shows that the risk perceptions of smoking among high school seniors have 
significantly increased relative to those for drinking and binge drinking. Their risk perceptions of 
smoking steadily rose by 31 percent from 1976 to 2008, while their risk perceptions of drinking rose 
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by 55 percent from 1976 to 1991, and then steadily decreased by 40 percent until 2003. Then, their 
risk perceptions of drinking started rising again by 23 percent. Their risk perceptions of binge 
drinking rose from 1976 to 1996 by 34 percent. Then it sharply declined by 14 percent from 1996 to 
1998, and then it rose again by 10 percent until 2008. 
Furthermore, the MTF project provides data on variables that could affect the respondent’s 
consumption of cigarettes or alcohol. The MTF project provides data at the individual level for 
variables such as the respondent’s self-rated intelligence and self-rated school ability compared to 
others of the same age, the highest level of schooling completed by the respondent’s mother, the 
highest level of schooling completed by the respondent’s father, the amount of time that the 
respondent’s mother spent at a paid job (half-time or more) during the time when the respondent 
was growing up, the importance of religion in the respondent’s life, the presence of the respondent’s 
mother in his or her household, the presence of the respondent’s father in his or her household, the 
presence of any siblings in the respondent’s household, the amount of time needed for the 
respondent to graduate from high school, the amount of money the respondent gets from a job or 
other work, and the amount of money the respondent gets from other sources such as allowances. 
However, given the small number of years for which these data are available, I only consider 
variables that show the highest of variation from 1976 to 2008 and that affect consumption of 
cigarettes and alcohol the most. These variables are the maximum amount of education obtained by 
the respondent’s father, the maximum amount of education obtained by the respondent’s mother, 
the amount of time the respondent’s mother spent working, the amount of money the respondent 
gets from a job or other work during an average week, and the amount of money the respondent 
gets from other sources such as allowances during an average week. For questions in the MTF 
questionnaire that involved the respondent’s mother or father, the respondent was given an option 
such as “don’t know or does not apply” to answer these questions. Therefore, the absence of any of 
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the parents in the respondent’s household did not affect the variables measuring the education level 
of the respondent’s parents nor the amount of time the respondent’s mother spent working. 
I use the MTF data on the maximum amount of education obtained by the respondent’s 
father to construct a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent’s father had some college 
education, finished college, or attended grad school after college. Otherwise, this dummy variable is 
zero. Then, I use this dummy variable to calculate the annual fraction of high school seniors’ fathers 
that had some college education, finished college, or attended grad school after college.8 Finally, I 
express this fraction in yearly percentages. I create a similar variable using the MTF data on the 
maximum amount of education obtained by the respondent’s mother. For simplicity, I will refer to 
these variables as father’s education and mother’s education, respectively. Similarly, I use the MTF data on 
the amount of time the respondent’s mother spent working to create a dummy variable that equals 
one if the respondent’s mother worked most, all, or nearly all of the time while the respondent was 
growing up. Otherwise, this dummy variable is zero. Then, I use this dummy variable to calculate the 
annual fraction of high school seniors’ mothers that worked most, all, or nearly all of the time while 
the respondent was growing up. Then, I express this fraction in yearly percentages. I will refer to this 
variable as mother’s employment. Regarding the respondent’s income, the MTF project collects data on 
the amount of money the respondent gets from a job or other work during an average week. 
Additionally, the MTF project collects data on the amount of money the respondent gets from other 
sources such as allowances during an average week. The MTF project collects these data by asking 
two different questions. To answer each of these questions, the respondent had alternatives such as 
1: $0, 2: $1-$5, 3: $6-$10, etc. I combine these data to create an income variable for the respondent 
by replacing the label of each alternative (1, 2, 3, etc.) with the midpoint value of their respective 
                                                 
8 This calculation is the weighted average of the dummy variable. The weights are sampling weights provided 
by the MTF project. Mother’s education and mother’s employment are based on the same procedure. 
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intervals9 ($0, $3, $8, etc.). Then, I add the frequencies of the option chosen by the respondent to 
answer each of the two questions. With this new combined income per week variable at the 
individual level, I calculate the weighted weekly average income for each year and then express it in 
real terms. I will refer to this variable as real income. Figure 4 shows time trends for these four 
variables. 
Furthermore, when estimating the demand function for drinking and binge drinking, I 
include the minimum legal age to purchase beer with 3.2 percent or lower alcohol by weight in the 
demand equation. I will refer to this variable as legal age. This variable is a population-weighted 
average of the minimum legal age needed to purchase alcoholic beverages effective in all states in the 
United States in a given year. For this measure, the weights are the fraction of the United States’ 
population residing in each state in a given year. Even though all states imposed a minimum legal 
drinking age of 21 years old by 1988, many states also passed “grandfather clauses.” These clauses 
were exceptions for state residents who happened to be of legal drinking age before the new legal 
drinking age of twenty-one was imposed. Thus, twenty-one did not become the official minimum 
drinking age across the United States until 1991. For this reason, the variable for minimum legal 
drinking age is lagged one year before it is incorporated into the model. This method allows for the 
delay in obtaining a consistent minimum drinking age in all states. I obtained this minimum legal 
drinking age variable from Saffer, Chaloupka, and Grossman (1993). 
Missing values at the individual level were carefully addressed when creating these aggregated 
variables from the MTF data. Observations with missing variables where only dropped when those 
variables were essential to the analysis. In other words, I only dropped observations with data 
missing on gender, race, and risk perceptions associated to smoking, drinking, or binge drinking 
when separating the data in subsamples of male, female, white, and nonwhite high school seniors as 
                                                 
9 For open intervals such as the last option provided to answer these questions, the closest multiple of 10 
greater than the lower limit of the interval was chosen as the “midpoint value.” 
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well as subsamples composed of those who believe these are activities of great risk and those who 
do not. 
Tables 1, 2, and 3 show summary statistics for the variables used to estimate the time-series 
demand functions for smoking, drinking, and binge drinking, respectively. These tables also show 
summary statistics for subsamples of males, females, whites, and nonwhites as well as subsamples 
composed of those who believe these are activities of great risk and those who do not. Table 1 
shows a peculiarity of the data set. In 1992, in order to separate the sample into male and female 
high school seniors, I dropped the observations that did not have data on gender. After dropping 
these observations, the weighted means for the male and female high school seniors subsamples 
were lower than the weighted mean for the whole sample. The cigarette consumption means for 
male and female high school seniors in Table 1 are below the cigarette consumption mean for the 





4.1. Econometric approach 
As pointed out previously, I use OLS to estimate time-series demand functions for smoking, 
drinking, and binge drinking for high school seniors in the United States from 1976 to 2008. In 
these demand functions, cigarette, alcohol, and excessive alcohol consumption are the dependent 
variables. Cigarette consumption (or smoking) is the percentage of high school seniors who smoked 
cigarettes in the past thirty days (even if it was less than one cigarette a day), alcohol consumption 
(or drinking) is the percentage of high school seniors who consumed an alcoholic beverage at least 
once in the last twelve months, and excessive alcohol consumption (or binge drinking) is the 
percentage of high school seniors who had five or more drinks in a row on at least one day in the 
past two weeks. My main approach is to estimate these time-series demand functions for smoking, 
drinking, and binge drinking using OLS. I use the OLS price coefficients to calculate price elasticities 
of demand for smoking, drinking, and binge drinking evaluated at their respective sample means. In 
my second approach, I use a double log model to estimate regression coefficients that represent 
elasticities. I use these price elasticity estimates to corroborate the price elasticities of demand 
evaluated at the means obtained from the OLS model. 
In my main approach, the time-series demand equation used for smoking, drinking, and 
binge drinking specifies the yearly percentage of high school seniors who participate in these 
activities as a function of their respective real price, time trends, their respective perception of risk, 
and a set of additional covariates that includes real income, father’s and mother’s education, and 
mother’s employment. When estimating the demand functions for drinking and binge drinking, the 
minimum legal drinking age is included in the demand functions. This time-series demand function 
specification can be expressed as, 
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𝐶𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑡2 + 𝛽4𝑡3 + 𝛽5𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝑥𝑡′𝛿 + 𝜀𝑡 
For cigarette consumption, 𝐶𝑡 is the percentage of high school seniors who smoked 
cigarettes in the past thirty days in year 𝑡, 𝑝𝑡 is the real price of cigarettes (a proxy used for the cost 
of smoking) assigned for year 𝑡, 𝑡 is a linear time trend, 𝑡2 is a quadratic time trend, 𝑡3 is a cubic 
time trend, 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 is a risk variable measuring the percentage of high school seniors who consider 
smoking an activity of great risk (a measure of risk perception) in year 𝑡, and 𝑥𝑡 is a column vector 
of covariates including real weekly income in year 𝑡, father’s education in year 𝑡, mother’s education 
in year 𝑡, and mother’s employment in year 𝑡 (𝛿 is a column vector of unknown coefficients). For 
simplicity, I will refer to this column vector of covariates 𝑥𝑡 as “the additional covariates.” 
As I mentioned previously, I use the real cigarette price as a proxy for the cost of smoking 
when estimating its demand function. In the MTF project, high school seniors answer 
questionnaires while at school between March 15 and April 30 of year 𝑡, and their answers reflect 
their cigarette consumption in the past thirty days. Because Orzechowski and Walker (2008) publish 
their data on nominal cigarette prices in November of every year, the cigarette consumption 
reported by high school seniors is subject to the nominal cigarette price published in year 𝑡 − 1. 
Therefore, the real cigarette price used in the demand equation for smoking is the real price as of 
November of year 𝑡 − 1. Also, nominal cigarette prices were adjusted for changes throughout time 
using the following criteria developed by Grossman (2004): four cents were added to the November 
1982 nominal price to reflect the eight-cent increase in the Federal tax on a package of cigarettes on 
January 1, 1983. Two cents were added to the November 1990 and November 1992 nominal prices 
to reflect the four-cent increase in the Federal tax on January 1, 1991 and 1993. Five cents were 
added to the November 1999 nominal price to reflect the ten-cent increase in the Federal tax on 
January 1, 2000. Two cents were added to the November 2002 nominal price to reflect the five-cent 
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increase in the Federal tax on January 1, 2003. Then, 31.1 cents were added to the November 1998 
price to reflect the 45-cent increase in the nominal price in late November 1998. This last increase 
reflects the Master Settlement Agreement.10 
The time-series demand function specifications for alcohol consumption and excessive 
alcohol consumption use basically the same variables as the demand function specification for 
cigarette consumption. The difference is that 𝐶𝑡 and 𝑝𝑡 have different meanings and there is an 
additional variable in the column vector of covariates 𝑥𝑡. For alcohol consumption, 𝐶𝑡 is the 
percentage of high school seniors who consumed an alcoholic beverage at least once in the last 
twelve months in year 𝑡. For excessive alcohol consumption, 𝐶𝑡 is the percentage of high school 
seniors who had five or more drinks in a row on at least one day in the past two weeks in year 𝑡. 𝑝𝑡 
is the real price of beer (a proxy used for the cost of drinking and binge drinking) assigned for year 𝑡. 
The additional variable included in 𝑥𝑡 is the minimum legal drinking age in year 𝑡. 
I use the real beer price as a proxy for the cost of drinking and binge drinking because there 
is evidence in the literature showing that beer is the drink of choice among young people who 
consume alcoholic beverages (Grossman, Chaloupka, and Sirtalan 1998). For alcohol consumption, 
the real beer price used in the demand equation is lagged by one year because drinking is measured 
during the past year. For excessive alcohol consumption, which is measured in the last two weeks, 
the real beer price used in the demand equation is the arithmetic average of the real beer price in the 
fourth quarter of year 𝑡 − 1 and the first quarter of year 𝑡.11 From this point forward, I will not 
make an explicit distinction between the lagged real beer price (proxy used for the cost of alcohol 
                                                 
10 The logic of these adjustments is that smoking decisions reported in the MTF project during year 𝑡 were 
subject to the nominal prices effective from October in the year 𝑡 − 1 to March of year t. 
 
11 Estimates using just the real beer price in the first quarter of year t were also calculated. Since they yield 
very similar results, this study follows the approach found in the literature and presents the results found 




consumption) and the arithmetic average of the real beer price in the fourth quarter of year 𝑡 − 1 
and the first quarter of year 𝑡 (proxy used for the cost of binge drinking). When discussing the 
demand equations for drinking or binge drinking, I will refer to both as the real beer price. 
To circumvent the correlation between price and time, I experiment with linear, quadratic, 
and cubic time trends and pay very careful attention to the sensitivity of my results to these 
alternative specifications. Including these time trends allows me to obtain lower residual variances 
when estimating the demand functions for smoking, drinking, and binge drinking. This is an 
approach similar to the one used by Grossman (2004). For cigarette consumption, alcohol 
consumption, and excessive alcohol consumption, including these three time trend specifications 
lowered the residual variance of the regressions without significantly changing the price coefficient 
(as well as other coefficients). Therefore, when estimating the demand for smoking, drinking, and 
binge drinking, I only present the results of specifications that include the three time trends. These 
results are discussed in detail in section 5. 
In my second approach, I estimate time-series demand functions for smoking, drinking, and 
binge drinking using a double log model to obtain regression coefficients that reflect elasticities. This 
approach will allow me to obtain new elasticity estimates that I will compare with the elasticity 
estimates measured at the sample means obtained from the OLS approach. The main equation for 
smoking, drinking, and binge drinking in this model specifies the natural log of the yearly percentage 
of high school seniors who participate in these activities as a function of the natural log of real price, 
time trends, perceptions of risk, and a set of additional covariates that includes the natural log of real 
income, father’s and mother’s education, mother’s employment, and the minimum legal drinking age, 
which is only included when estimating the demand functions for drinking and binge drinking. This 
time-series demand function specification can be expressed as, 
ln𝐶𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑡2 + 𝛽4𝑡3 + 𝛽5𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝑥𝑡′𝛿 + 𝜀𝑡 
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The regression specification in this approach is the same one as in the first approach except 
that, for smoking, ln𝐶𝑡 is the natural log of the percentage of high school seniors who smoked 
cigarettes in the past thirty days in year 𝑡, ln 𝑝𝑡 is the natural log of the real cigarette price (a proxy 
used for the cost of smoking) assigned for year 𝑡, and 𝑥𝑡 includes the natural log of real income in 
year 𝑡. For alcohol consumption, ln𝐶𝑡 is the natural log of the percentage of high school seniors 
who consumed an alcoholic beverage at least once in the last twelve months in year 𝑡. For excessive 
alcohol consumption, ln𝐶𝑡 is the natural log of the percentage of high school seniors who had five 
or more drinks in a row on at least one day in the past two weeks in year 𝑡. ln 𝑝𝑡 is the natural log of 
the real price of beer, and it is used as a proxy for the cost of drinking and binge drinking for year 𝑡. 
The proxies used for the real prices of smoking, drinking, and binge drinking are the same as the 
ones explained in the first approach. Finally, for alcohol and excessive alcohol consumption, 𝑥𝑡 
includes the natural log of real income in year 𝑡. 
For both approaches, I use different regression specifications. I start with a basic 
specification where I estimate smoking, drinking, and binge drinking based on their respective real 
prices and time trends. I use this basic specification as a base case, which I use to compare with 
three additional specifications. The next two specifications deal with the possible endogeneity of the 
risk variable and its possible correlation with the real price variable (see next section for a detailed 
explanation). The second specification allows for a direct effect of real price on consumption by 
estimating smoking, drinking, and binge drinking based on their respective real prices, time trends, 
and the additional covariates, while keeping risk constant. The third specification allows for an 
indirect effect of real price on consumption by estimating smoking, drinking, and binge drinking 
based on time trends, their respective perceptions of great risk of consumption, and the additional 
covariates, while keeping real price constant. The fourth specification includes real price, time trends, 
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risk variable, and the additional covariates as explanatory variables. Finally, I use two more 
specifications to estimate smoking, drinking, and binge drinking. These fifth and sixth specifications 
are the same as the second specification, except that they are based, respectively, on subsamples of 
high school seniors whose perceptions of the risk associated with smoking, drinking, and binge 
drinking are great and those whose perceptions of risk are not great. This analysis is repeated for 
subsamples composed of male, female, white, and nonwhite high school seniors. 
 
4.2. Potential issues 
One potential issue when estimating demand functions for smoking, drinking and binge 
drinking is the endogeneity of the price variable due to the simultaneous determination of price and 
quantity demanded. This problem is what the literature refers to as the identification problem. 
However, characteristics of the supply of cigarettes in the United States mitigate this identification 
problem. 
For instance, given the efforts of the United States Government to set production quotas 
and price supports for tobacco production to guarantee a fixed market price for tobacco, most of 
the cigarettes sold in the United States use tobacco grown also in the United States (Womach 2003). 
Therefore, cigarette producers face a constant price for tobacco, which is the main input in cigarette 
production. Chaloupka and Warner (2000) state that the costs of other inputs in cigarette production 
are essentially constant and that cigarette producers face virtually constant costs measured on a per-
pack basis. Moreover, Coats (1995) argues that even though the price of tobacco and other inputs 
change from year to year, on a given year, the supply curve for cigarettes is essentially perfectly 
22 
 
elastic. Using the evidence in the literature, I assume a perfectly elastic supply curve for cigarettes 
and therefore an exogenous price variable. I make the same assumption for alcohol.12 
Another potential issue arises when including the risk variable in the demand equation. The 
risk variable can be correlated with an unmeasured characteristic of the respondent (a thrill-seeking 
personality, for example). Also, there is a plausible reverse causality from consumption to risk 
perceptions. For instance, if a teenager’s risk perception of smoking, drinking, or binge drinking is 
low, then that person might be more likely to engage in these activities. Similarly, a teenager who 
smokes, drinks, or binge drinks may be less likely to perceive these activities as risky activities. These 
issues make the risk variable endogenous and render its regression coefficient biased and 
inconsistent. 
Moreover, price can be correlated with risk. That is, a lower price increases consumption and 
therefore lowers the risk perception of high school seniors because they see more people smoking, 
drinking, or binge drinking. If price is correlated with risk, then the real price coefficient will also be 
biased. This correlation between price and risk can allow price to affect cigarette and alcohol 
consumption directly and indirectly through the risk perception variable. In this case, the logical 
approach would be to use an Instrument Variables model. However, no instrument for price is 
considered in this study. Instead, as mentioned in the previous section, I include a third and fourth 
specification, which allow a direct effect of real price on consumption by keeping risk constant and 
an indirect effect of real price on consumption by keeping real price constant, respectively. These 
two regression specifications will allow me to observe the importance of real price as a determinant 
of consumption and to determine how real price coefficients change when risk perception is 
included or excluded from the regression. 
                                                 
12 If the supply function for cigarettes or alcohol is upward sloping, then the price effects will be understated 
in absolute value. 
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To address issues regarding heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, I obtain Newey-West 
(1987) t-ratios for the regression coefficients when estimating the demands for smoking, drinking, 
and binge drinking. The standard errors on which these Newey-West t-rations are based allows for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation up to and including a lag of three (Davidson and MacKinnon 
James 1993).13 
 
4.3. Expected relationships 
Expected relationships between consumption (𝐶𝑡) and real price (𝑝𝑡), risk (𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡), and the 
additional covariates (𝑥𝑡) are the same for the OLS and double log models. For cigarette 
consumption, price is expected to have a negative effect on smoking, which leads to a negative price 
elasticity of demand estimates. Price elasticity of demand estimates are also expected to be similar to 
the evidence present in the literature, so they should be close to -0.4. 
Risk is expected to have a negative effect on smoking. As one would assume, perceptions of 
great risk associated with smoking should decrease smoking participation. In general, real income is 
expected to have a negative effect on smoking (Townsend, Roderick, and Cooper 1994; Wasserman 
et al. 1991). However, among high school seniors, real income is expected to have a positive effect 
on smoking because they discount the future more heavily (Grossman and Chaloupka 1997). This 
will make income elasticity estimates positive. 
Father’s and mother’s education are expected to have negative signs. Since smoking is more 
common among people with less education (Chaloupka and Warner 2000), high school seniors with 
more educated parents will be more likely to be discouraged from smoking by their parents. Finally, 
                                                 




mother’s employment is expected to positively affect smoking since one would expect unsupervised 
high school seniors to smoke more than those under more constant supervision. 
For alcohol consumption and excessive alcohol consumption, real beer price is expected to 
be negatively correlated with drinking and binge drinking, which leads to negative price elasticity of 
demand estimates. Risk is expected to have a negative effect on binge drinking because high school 
seniors who associate this activity with a great risk of harm are less likely to partake in it. However, 
risk is not expected to have such a clear effect on drinking since drinking in moderation can have 
positive health outcomes such as reducing the probability of coronary heart disease, as pointed out 
by Klatsky, Armstrong, and Friedman (1990), for example. Also, higher risk perception when it 
comes to alcohol can reinstate patterns of moderate drinking and therefore increase alcohol 
consumption in moderate quantities. Real income is expected to have a positive effect on drinking 
and binge drinking among high school students because they discount the future more heavily. This 
positive relationship will make income elasticity estimates positive. Father and mother’s education 
are expected to have a positive sign for drinking since moderate alcohol consumption is expected to 
be more common among parents with higher education–a habit that can subconsciously educate 
their children about moderate alcohol consumption. Similarly, father and mother’s education is 
expected to have a negative sign for binge drinking since excessive alcohol consumption is expected 
to be far less common among highly educated parents, which is a habit that can subconsciously 
teach their children not to consume alcohol excessively. Finally, mother’s employment is expected to 
positively affect drinking and binge drinking since one would expect unsupervised high school 
seniors to be more prone to drink and binge drink than those under more constant supervision.  
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5. Empirical Results 
 
The OLS and double log approaches will be used to estimate time-series demand functions 
for smoking, drinking, and binge drinking. Sections 5.1-5.3 present the main results using the OLS 
approach. Section 5.4 present results using the double log approach. 
 
5.1. Cigarette consumption 
As mentioned in the previous section, I estimate the demand function for smoking using the 
following regression specifications: 
1. 𝐶𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑡2 + 𝛽4𝑡3 + 𝜀𝑡 
2. 𝐶𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑡2 + 𝛽4𝑡3 + 𝑥𝑡′ 𝛿 + 𝜀𝑡 
3. 𝐶𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡2 + 𝛽3𝑡3 + 𝛽4𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝑥𝑡′𝛿 + 𝜀𝑡 
4. 𝐶𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑡2 + 𝛽4𝑡3 + 𝛽5𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝑥𝑡′𝛿 + 𝜀𝑡 
5. 𝐶𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑡2 + 𝛽4𝑡3 + 𝑥𝑡′ 𝛿 + 𝜀𝑡 
6. 𝐶𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑡2 + 𝛽4𝑡3 + 𝑥𝑡′ 𝛿 + 𝜀𝑡 
where regression 1 shows the base model. Regression 2 adds the additional covariates to the base 
model, and it allows a direct effect of price on consumption. Regression 3 adds the risk perceptions 
of smoking to the demand equation and excludes the real cigarette price in the regression, allowing 
an indirect effect of price on consumption through the risk variable. Regression 4 evaluates the 
effect of price on consumption while the risk variable is included in the demand equation. 
Regressions 5 and 6 are respectively based on a subsample of high school seniors that believe 
smoking is an activity of great risk and a subsample of high school seniors that do not believe 
smoking is an activity of great risk. I perform the same analysis for the double log approach with the 
appropriate changes to the variables, as stated in the previous section. 
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Table 4 shows OLS regressions for smoking. In general, we can see that the real price 
coefficient remains negative and significant in all the regressions, except regression 6, where the real 
price coefficient is not significant. The risk perception coefficients in regressions 3 and 4 are 
negative, as expected, and significant. Price elasticities of demand evaluated at the means range from 
-0.63 to -0.23 when the additional covariates are present in the demand equation. The real income 
coefficients are significant and positive in all the regressions and income elasticities range from 0.25 
to 0.48, indicating that cigarettes are considered a normal good among those high school seniors 
who smoke. 
Although the coefficients of the additional covariates are insignificant in their majority, their 
inclusion in the regressions shows that the real price coefficient is a robust estimator because it 
remained negative and significant after including all these control variables. In particular, regression 
2 shows that after adding just the additional covariates, a 10-percentage point increase in the real 
cigarette price decreases cigarette consumption among high school seniors by 1.25 percentage points. 
Regression 3, which allows for an indirect effect of real cigarette price on smoking through 
the risk variable, shows a significant and negative risk coefficient. In particular, a 10-percentage 
point increase in the percentage of high school seniors who believe smoking is associated with a 
great risk of harm decreases cigarette smoking by 7.69 percentage points. In regression 4, where the 
risk variable is present in the demand equation along with the real cigarette price, the absolute value 
of the real cigarette price coefficient decreased from 0.125 to 0.110. Additionally, the absolute value 
of the price elasticity of demand reduced from 0.56 to 0.50, and the absolute value of the risk 
coefficient decreased from 0.769 to 0.278. 
Moreover, high school seniors whose risk perceptions of smoking are great clearly respond 
more to a price increase than high school seniors whose risk perceptions are not great. The absolute 




5.1.1. Males and females 
Table 5 shows OLS regressions for smoking among male high school seniors. In general, we 
can see that the real price coefficient remains negative and significant in all the regressions. The risk 
perception coefficients in regressions 3 and 4 are negative, as it was expected, but significant only in 
regression 3. The price elasticities of demand evaluated at the means range from -0.84 to -0.32 when 
the additional covariates are present in the regression. The real income coefficients are positive, but 
only significant in regression 5. The income elasticities range from 0.15 to 0.45. 
When the additional covariates are added to the basic regression specification, a 10-
percentage point increase in the real cigarette price decreases cigarette smoking among male high 
school seniors by 1.24 percentage points. 
Regression 3, which allows for an indirect effect of real cigarette price on smoking through 
the risk variable, shows a negative and significant risk coefficient. In particular, a 10-percentage 
point increase in the percentage of male high school seniors who believe smoking is associated with 
a great risk of harm decreases their cigarette smoking by 3.18 percentage points. In regression 4, 
where the risk perception variable is present in the demand equation along with the real cigarette 
price, the absolute value of the real cigarette price coefficient decreased from 0.124 to 0.119. 
Additionally, the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand reduced from 0.57 to 0.55, and the 
absolute value of the risk coefficient decreased from 0.318 to 0.142. 
Moreover, male high school seniors whose risk perceptions of smoking are great clearly 
respond more to a price increase than male high school seniors whose risk perceptions are not great. 
The absolute value of their respective price elasticities of demand are 0.84 and 0.32. 
Table 6 shows OLS regressions for smoking among female high school seniors. On a 
general overview, we can see that the real price coefficient remains negative and significant in all the 
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regressions. The risk perception coefficients in regressions 3 and 4 are negative, as it was expected, 
and they are also significant. The price elasticities of demand evaluated at the means range from       
-0.57 to -0.33 when the additional covariates are included in the demand equation. The real income 
coefficients are positive in all specifications and also significant, except in regression 6. The income 
elasticities range from 0.21 to 0.57, which indicates that cigarettes are considered a normal good 
among female high school seniors who smoke. 
When the additional covariates are added to the basic regression specification, a 10-
percentage point increase in the real cigarette price decreases cigarette smoking among female high 
school seniors by 1.25 percentage points. Also, including the additional covariates increased the 
price elasticity of demand, in absolute value, from 0.55 to 0.57. 
Regression 3, which allows for an indirect effect of real cigarette price on smoking through 
the risk variable, shows a negative and significant risk coefficient. In particular, a 10-percentage 
point increase in the percentage of female high school seniors who believe smoking is associated 
with a great risk of harm decreases their cigarette smoking by 7.51 percentage points. In regression 4, 
where the risk perception variable is present in the demand equation along with the real price, the 
absolute value of the real cigarette price coefficient decreased from 0.125 to 0.098. Additionally, the 
absolute value of the price elasticity of demand reduced from 0.57 to 0.44, and the absolute value of 
the risk coefficient decreased from 0.751 to 0.371. 
Moreover, the response to a price increase among female high school seniors whose risk 
perceptions of smoking are great is clearly stronger than the response of female high school seniors 
whose risk perceptions are not great. The absolute value of their respective price elasticities of 




5.1.2. Whites and nonwhites 
Table 7 shows OLS regressions for smoking among white high school seniors. In general, 
we can see that the real price coefficient remains negative and significant in all the regressions. The 
risk perception coefficients in regressions 3 and 4 are negative, as it was expected, but significant 
only in regression 3. The price elasticities of demand evaluated at the means range from -0.62 to       
-0.32 when the additional covariates are present in the demand equation. The real income 
coefficients are positive in all the regression specifications and not significant only in regression 6. 
The income elasticities are positive and range between 0.17 and 0.24, indicating that among white 
high school seniors who smoke, cigarettes are a normal good. 
When the additional covariates are added to the basic regression specification, a 10-
percentage point increase in the real cigarette price decreases cigarette smoking among white high 
school seniors by 1.50 percentage points. Also, including the additional covariates increased the 
price elasticity of demand, in absolute value, from 0.60 to 0.62. 
Regression 3, which allows for an indirect effect of real cigarette price on smoking through 
the risk variable, shows a negative and significant, risk coefficient. In particular, a 10-percentage 
point increase in the percentage of white high school seniors who believe smoking is associated with 
a great risk of harm decreases their cigarette smoking by 8.55 percentage points. In regression 4, 
where the risk perception variable is present in the demand equation along with the real cigarette 
price, the absolute value of the real cigarette price coefficient decreased from 0.150 to 0.124. 
Additionally, the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand reduced from 0.62 to 0.51, and the 
absolute value of the risk coefficient decreased from 0.855 to 0.300. 
Moreover, white high school seniors whose risk perceptions of smoking are great clearly 
respond more to a price increase than white high school seniors whose risk perceptions are not great. 
The absolute value of their respective price elasticities of demand are 0.62 and 0.32. 
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Table 8 shows OLS regressions for smoking among nonwhite high school seniors. In 
general, we can see that the real price coefficient remains negative and significant in all the 
regressions, except in regression 6. The risk perception coefficients in regressions 3 and 4 are 
negative, as it was expected, and significant. The price elasticities of demand evaluated at the means 
range from -0.75 to -0.51 when the additional covariates are included in the demand equation. The 
real income coefficients are positive and not significant in any of the regression specifications. The 
income elasticities are positive and range from 0.20 to 0.58. 
When the additional covariates are added to the basic regression specification, a 10-
percentage point increase in the real cigarette price decreases cigarette smoking among nonwhite 
high school seniors by 0.92 percentage points. The effect of price on consumption seems to be 
smaller in absolute value among nonwhite high school seniors. Also, the price elasticity of demand 
decreased from 0.78 to 0.75 when the additional covariates are included in the regression. 
Regression 3, which allows for an indirect effect of real cigarette price on smoking through 
the risk variable, shows a negative and significant risk coefficient. In particular, a 10-percentage 
point increase in the percentage of nonwhite high school seniors who believe smoking is associated 
with a great risk of harm decreases their cigarette smoking by 2.96 percentage points. In regression 4, 
where the risk perception variable is present in the demand equation along with the real price, the 
absolute value of the real cigarette price coefficient decreased from 0.092 to 0.078. Additionally, the 
absolute value of the price elasticity of demand reduced from 0.75 to 0.64, and the absolute value of 
the risk coefficient decreased from 0.296 to 0.175. 
Moreover, the response to a price increase among nonwhite high school seniors whose risk 
perceptions of smoking are great is larger than the response of nonwhite high school seniors whose 
risk perceptions are not great. The absolute value of their respective price elasticities of demand are 





If we exclude the price elasticities of demand calculated using the real price coefficient from 
the base model (regression 1), the price elasticities of demand for smoking range from -0.63 to -0.23 
for the whole sample. For subsamples of male, female, white, and nonwhite high school seniors, 
they range from -0.84 to -0.32, from -0.57 to -0.33, from -0.62 to -0.32, and from -0.75 to -0.51, 
respectively. Overall, the price elasticities remain somewhat consistent across specifications. When 
comparing male and female high school seniors, their price elasticities of demand do not clearly 
indicate which subsample responds more to changes in real cigarette prices. There is no consensus 
among these elasticities since they vary, although slightly, depending on the regression specification. 
However, it seems to be clear that male and female high school seniors respond more to an increase 
in the real cigarette price when they associate smoking with a great risk of harm. 
When comparing white and nonwhite high school seniors, their price elasticities of demand 
clearly indicate that nonwhite high school seniors are more responsive to a real cigarette price 
increase than white high school seniors. Moreover, both white and nonwhite high school seniors 
respond more to an increase in real cigarettes price when they associate smoking with a great risk of 
harm. 
 
5.2. Alcohol consumption 
Tables 9-13 present the empirical results for alcohol consumption using the same regression 
specifications used for smoking and adding the minimum legal drinking age to the additional 
covariates. 
Table 9 shows OLS regressions for drinking. In general, we can see that the real price 
coefficient remains negative and significant in all the specifications, except in regression 5, where the 
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real price coefficient is not significant. The risk perception coefficients in regressions 3 and 4 are 
negative, as expected, and significant. Price elasticities of demand evaluated at the means range 
widely from -0.42 to -0.31 when the additional covariates are present in the regression. The real 
income coefficients are positive in all regression specifications and also significant, except when the 
sample is separated into high school seniors who believe drinking is an activity of great risk and 
those who do not think drinking is an activity of great risk. The income elasticities range from 0.08 
to 0.22, which indicates that alcohol is considered a normal good among those high school seniors 
who drink alcoholic beverages.   
Regression 2 shows that after adding just the additional covariates, a 10-percentage point 
increase in the real beer price decreases drinking among high school seniors by 3.40 percentage 
points. Also, including the additional covariates in the regression decreased the price elasticity of 
demand, in absolute value, from 0.56 to 0.42. 
Regression 3, which allows for an indirect effect of real beer price on drinking through the 
risk variable, shows a negative and significant risk coefficient. In particular, a 10-percentage point 
increase in the percentage of high school seniors who believe drinking is associated with a great risk 
of harm decreases their drinking by 3.52 percentage points. In regression 4, where the risk variable is 
present in the demand equation along with the real beer price, the absolute value of the real beer 
price coefficient decreased from 0.340 to 0.316. Additionally, the absolute value of the price 
elasticity of demand decreased from 0.42 to 0.39, and the risk coefficient decreased from 0.352 to 
0.314 in absolute value. 
Moreover, regressions 5 and 6 show that high school seniors whose risk perceptions of 
drinking are great respond more to a price increase than high school seniors whose risk perceptions 




5.2.1. Males and females 
Table 10 shows OLS regressions for drinking among male high school seniors. In general, 
we can see that the real price coefficient remains negative and significant in all the regressions except 
in regression 5, where the real price coefficient is not significant. The risk perception coefficients are 
not significant, and they are negative. The price elasticities of demand evaluated at the means range 
from -0.55 to -0.24 when the additional covariates are present in the demand equation. The real 
income coefficients are positive in all specifications and also significant, except in regressions 5 and 
6, where the real income coefficient is not significant. The income elasticities range from 0.05 to 
0.20, which indicates that alcohol is considered a normal good among those high school seniors who 
drink alcoholic beverages. 
Regression 2, where the additional covariates are added to the basic regression specification, 
indicates that a 10-percentage point increase in the real beer price decreases drinking among male 
high school seniors by 3.85 percentage points. Also, including the additional covariates decreased the 
price elasticity of demand, in absolute value, from 0.63 to 0.48. 
Regression 3, which allows for an indirect effect of real beer price on drinking through the 
risk variable, shows a negative and not significant risk coefficient. In particular, a 10-percentage 
point increase in the percentage of male high school seniors who believe drinking is associated with 
a great risk of harm decreases their drinking by 2.42 percentage points. In regression 4, where the 
risk perception variable is present in the demand equation along with the real beer price, the 
absolute value of the real beer price coefficient decreased from 0.385 to 0.375. Additionally, the 
absolute value of the price elasticity of demand decreased from 0.48 to 0.46, and the risk coefficient 
also decreased, in absolute value, from 0.242 to 0.180. 
Moreover, regressions 5 and 6 show interesting results. Male high school seniors whose risk 
perceptions of drinking are great respond less to a price increase than male high school seniors 
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whose risk perceptions are not great. The absolute value of their respective price elasticities of 
demand are 0.24 and 0.55. 
Table 11 shows OLS regressions for drinking among female high school seniors. On a 
general overview, we can see that the real price coefficients are negative in all the regression 
specifications except for regression 6, where the only high school seniors taken into consideration 
are females who do not consider drinking a great risk. The risk perception coefficients are significant 
and negative. Except for regression 6, the price elasticities of demand evaluated at the means range 
from -0.35 to -0.29 when the additional covariates are included in the demand equation. The real 
income coefficients are positive and only significant in regressions 3 and 6. Income elasticities range 
between 0.03 and 0.17. 
Regression 2, where the additional covariates are added to the basic regression specification, 
shows that a 10-percentage point increase in the real beer price decreases drinking among female 
high school seniors by 2.52 percentage points. Also, including the additional covariates decreased the 
price elasticity of demand, in absolute value, from 0.47 to 0.32. 
Regression 3, which allows for an indirect effect of real beer price on drinking through the 
risk variable, shows a slightly positive, not significant risk coefficient. In particular, regression 3 
indicates that a 10-percentage point increase in the percentage of female high school seniors who 
believe drinking is associated with a great risk of harm decreases their drinking by 2.29 percentage 
points. In regression 4, where the risk perception variable is present in the demand equation along 
with the real price, the absolute value of the real beer price coefficient increased from 0.252 to 0.274. 
Additionally, the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand increased from 0.32 to 0.35, and 




5.2.2. Whites and nonwhites 
Table 12 shows OLS regressions for drinking among white high school seniors. On a general 
overview, we can see that the real price coefficient remains negative and significant in all the 
regressions, except in regression 5, where the real price coefficient is not significant. The risk 
perception coefficients are negative and significant. The price elasticities of demand evaluated at the 
means range from -0.41 to -0.27 when the additional covariates are present in the demand equation. 
The real income coefficients are positive and significant except in regressions 5 and 6, where they 
are not significant. 
Regression 2, where the additional covariates are added to the basic regression specification, 
indicates that a 10-percentage point increase in the real beer price decreases drinking among white 
high school seniors by 3.33 percentage points. Also, including the additional covariates decreased the 
price elasticity of demand, in absolute value, from 0.55 to 0.40. 
Regression 3, which allows for an indirect effect of real beer price on drinking through the 
risk variable, shows a negative and significant risk coefficient. In particular, a 10-percentage point 
increase in the percentage of white high school seniors who believe drinking is associated with a 
great risk of harm decreases their drinking by 4.41 percentage points. In regression 4, where the risk 
perception variable is present in the demand equation along with the real beer price, the absolute 
value of the real beer price coefficient decreased from 0.333 to 0.312. Additionally, the absolute 
value of the price elasticity of demand decreased from 0.40 to 0.37, and the risk coefficient 
decreased, in absolute value, from 0.441 to 0.421. 
Moreover, regressions 5 and 6 show that white high school seniors whose risk perceptions 
of drinking are great respond more to a price increase than those whose risk perceptions are not 
great. The absolute value of their respective price elasticities of demand are 0.41 and 0.27. 
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Table 13 shows OLS regressions for drinking among nonwhite high school seniors. In 
general, we can see that the real price coefficient is not significant and negative in most, but not all 
the regression specifications. The risk perception coefficients are negative, but only significant in 
regression 4. The price elasticities of demand evaluated at the means range widely when the 
additional covariates are included in the regression, and it is positive in regression 5, where the real 
price coefficient is positive. 
Regression 2, where the additional covariates are added to the basic regression specification, 
indicates that a 10-percentage point increase in the real beer price decreases drinking among 
nonwhite high school seniors by 0.01 percentage points. Regression 3, which allows for an indirect 
effect of real beer price on drinking through the risk variable, shows a negative, not significant risk 
coefficient. In particular, regression 3 indicates that a 10-percentage point increase in the percentage 
of nonwhite high school seniors who believe drinking is associated with a great risk of harm 
decreases their drinking by 0.82 percentage points. In regression 4, where the risk perception 
variable is present in the demand equation along with the real beer price, the absolute value of the 
real beer price coefficient increased from 0.001 to 0.018. Additionally, the absolute value of the price 
elasticity of demand increased from 0.002 to 0.028, and the risk coefficient barely increased, in 
absolute value, from 0.082 to 0.083. 
 
5.2.3. Elasticities 
If we exclude the price elasticities of demand calculated using the real price coefficient from 
the base model (regression 1), the price elasticities of demand for drinking range from -0.42 to -0.31 
for the whole sample. For subsamples of female and nonwhite high school seniors, the price 
elasticity of demand is positive for two particular regression specifications that include the additional 
covariates. With the exception of these two cases, the price elasticities of demand for subsamples of 
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male, female, white, and nonwhite high school seniors range from -0.55 to -0.24, from -0.35 to -0.29, 
from -0.41 to -0.27, and from -0.16 to -0.002, respectively. When comparing male and female high 
school seniors, their price elasticities from regressions 2 and 4 agree that male high school seniors 
respond more to changes in real beer prices than female high school seniors. However, no clear 
conclusion can be reached when looking at subsamples of male and female high school seniors that 
consider drinking an activity of great risk and male and female high school seniors that do not 
consider drinking an activity of great risk. When comparing white and nonwhite high school seniors, 
their price elasticities of demand indicate that white high school seniors respond more to changes in 
real beer prices than nonwhite high school seniors. Also, it is clear that white high school seniors 
respond more to an increase in the real beer price when they associate drinking with a great risk of 
harm. However, this conclusion cannot be reached for nonwhite high school seniors. 
 
5.3. Excessive alcohol consumption 
Using the same regression specifications used for alcohol consumption, Tables 9-13 present 
the empirical results for excessive alcohol consumption. Table 14 shows OLS regressions for binge 
drinking. On a general overview, we can see that the real price coefficient remains negative and 
significant in all the regressions. The risk perception coefficients in regressions 3 and 4 are negative, 
as expected, and significant. Price elasticities of demand evaluated at the means range from -1.76 to  
-0.58 when the additional covariates are present in the demand equation. The real income 
coefficients are positive, except in regression 6, and none of them are significant. Income elasticities 
range from 0.01 to 0.13, and it is -0.08 in regression 6. 
Although the coefficients of the additional covariates are insignificant in their majority, their 
inclusion in the regressions shows that the real price coefficient is a robust estimator because it 
remained negative and significant in the great majority of cases after including all these control 
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variables. In particular, regression 2 shows that after adding just the additional covariates, a 10-
percentage point increase in the real beer price decreases binge drinking among high school seniors 
by 5.64 percentage points. Also, including the additional covariates in the demand equation 
decreased the price elasticity of demand, in absolute value, from 2.26 to 1.67. 
Regression 3, which allows for an indirect effect of real beer price on binge drinking through 
the risk variable, shows a significant and negative risk coefficient. In particular, a 10-percentage 
point increase in the percentage of high school seniors who believe binge drinking is associated with 
a great risk of harm decreases their binge drinking by 4.88 percentage points. In regression 4, where 
the risk perception variable is present in the demand equation along with the real beer price, the 
absolute value of the real beer price coefficient decreased from 0.564 to 0.453. Additionally, the 
absolute value of the price elasticity of demand reduced from 1.67 to 1.34, and the absolute value of 
the risk coefficient decreased from 0.488 to 0.248. 
Moreover, high school seniors whose risk perceptions of binge drinking are great respond 
more to a price increase than high school seniors whose risk perceptions are not great. The absolute 
value of their respective price elasticities of demand are 1.76 and 0.58. 
 
5.3.1. Males and females 
Table 15 shows OLS regressions for binge drinking among male high school seniors. On a 
general overview, we can see that the real price coefficient remains negative in all the regressions, 
and it is significant in all the regressions except in regression 5. The risk perception coefficients in 
regressions 3 and 4 are negative, as it was expected, and significant. The price elasticities of demand 
evaluated at the means range from -1.24 to -0.51 when the additional covariates are present in the 
demand equation. The real income coefficients are positive, except for regression 6, and only 
significant in regression 2. Thus, with the exception of high school seniors who do not consider 
39 
 
binge drinking an activity of great risk, binge drinking is a normal good among male high school 
seniors who binge drink. 
When the additional covariates are added to the basic regression specification, a 10-
percentage point increase in the real beer price decreases binge drinking among male high school 
seniors by 5.17 percentage points. Also, including the additional covariates decreased the price 
elasticity of demand, in absolute value, from 1.91 to 1.24. 
Regression 3, which allows for an indirect effect of real beer price on binge drinking through 
the risk variable, shows a negative and significant risk coefficient. In particular, a 10-percentage 
point increase in the percentage of male high school seniors who believe binge drinking is associated 
with a great risk of harm decreases their binge drinking by 4.54 percentage points. In regression 4, 
where the risk perception variable is present in the demand equation along with the real beer price, 
the absolute value of the real beer price coefficient decreased from 0.517 to 0.417. Additionally, the 
absolute value of the price elasticity of demand decreased from 1.24 to 1.00, and the absolute value 
of the risk coefficient decreased from 0.454 to 0.251. 
Moreover, male high school seniors whose risk perceptions of binge drinking are great 
respond more to a price increase than male high school seniors whose risk perceptions are not great. 
The absolute value of their respective price elasticities of demand are 1.01 and 0.51. 
Table 16 shows OLS regressions for binge drinking among female high school seniors. On a 
general overview, we can see that the real price coefficient remains negative and significant in all the 
regressions. The risk perception coefficients in regressions 3 and 4 are negative, as it was expected, 
and significant only in regression 3. The price elasticities of demand evaluated at the means range 
from -2.22 to -0.98 when the additional covariates are included in the demand equation. The real 
income coefficients are positive and not significant in any of the regression specifications. Income 
elasticities range from 0.06 to 0.33. 
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When the additional covariates are added to the basic regression specification, a 10-
percentage point increase in the real beer price decreases binge drinking among female high school 
seniors by 5.01 percentage points. Also, including the additional covariates decreased the price 
elasticity of demand, in absolute value, from 2.67 to 1.93. 
Regression 3, which allows for an indirect effect of real beer price on binge drinking through 
the risk variable, shows a negative and significant risk coefficient. In particular, a 10-percentage 
point increase in the percentage of female high school seniors who believe binge drinking is 
associated with a great risk of harm decreases their binge drinking by 2.47 percentage points. In 
regression 4, where the risk perception variable is present in the demand equation along with the real 
price, the absolute value of the real beer price coefficient decreased from 0.501 to 0.455. 
Additionally, the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand decreased from 1.93 to 1.75, and 
the absolute value of the risk coefficient decreased from 0.247 to 0.150. 
Moreover, the response to a price increase among female high school seniors whose risk 
perceptions of binge drinking are great is stronger than the response of female high school seniors 
whose risk perceptions are not great. The absolute value of their respective price elasticities of 
demand are 2.22 and 0.98. 
 
5.3.2. Whites and nonwhites 
Table 17 shows OLS regressions for binge drinking among white high school seniors. On a 
general overview, we can see that the real price coefficient remains negative in all the regressions and 
significant in all the regressions except in regression 6. The risk perception coefficients in regressions 
3 and 4 are negative, as it was expected, and significant. The price elasticities of demand evaluated at 
the means range from -3.37 to -0.12 when the additional covariates are present in the demand 
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equation. The real income coefficients are not significant, and they are positive except in regressions 
5 and 6. 
When the additional covariates are added to the basic regression specification, a 10-
percentage point increase in the real beer price decreases binge drinking among white high school 
seniors by 6.99 percentage points. Also, including the additional covariates decreased the price 
elasticity of demand, in absolute value, from 2.33 to 1.85. 
Regression 3, which allows for an indirect effect of real beer price on binge drinking through 
the risk variable, shows a negative and significant, risk coefficient. In particular, a 10-percentage 
point increase in the percentage of white high school seniors who believe binge drinking is 
associated with a great risk of harm decreases their binge drinking by 5.49 percentage points. In 
regression 4, where the risk perception variable is present in the demand equation along with the real 
price, the absolute value of the real beer price coefficient decreased from 0.699 to 0.530. 
Additionally, the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand reduced from 1.85 to 1.40, and the 
absolute value of the risk coefficient decreased from 0.549 to 0.259. 
Moreover, white high school seniors whose risk perceptions of binge drinking are great 
respond more to a price increase than white high school seniors whose risk perceptions are not great. 
The absolute value of their respective price elasticities of demand are 3.37 and 0.12. 
Table 18 shows OLS regressions for smoking among nonwhite high school seniors. On a 
general overview, we can see that the real price coefficients are not significant in any of the 
regressions, and they are negative, except in regression 5. The risk perception coefficients in 
regressions 3 and 4 are negative, as it was expected, but not significant. The price elasticities of 
demand evaluated at the means range from -0.76 to -0.03 when the additional covariates are 
included in the demand equation, except for regression 5, where the price elasticity of demand is 
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positive. The real income coefficients are not significant in any of the regressions and positive in all 
the regressions, except in regression 5. 
When the additional covariates are added to the basic regression specification, a 10-
percentage point increase in the real beer price decreases binge drinking among nonwhite high 
school seniors by 0.05 percentage points. The effect of price on consumption seems to be smaller in 
absolute value among nonwhite high school seniors. Also, the price elasticity of demand decreased, 
in absolute value, from 0.19 to 0.03 when including the additional covariates. 
Regression 3, which allows for an indirect effect of real beer price on binge drinking through 
the risk variable, shows a negative, but not significant risk coefficient. In particular, a 10-percentage 
point increase in the percentage of nonwhite high school seniors who believe binge drinking is 
associated with a great risk of harm decreases their binge drinking 0.92 percentage points. In 
regression 4, where the risk perception variable is present in the demand equation along with the real 
price, the absolute value of the real beer price coefficient increased from 0.005 to 0.025. Additionally, 
the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand barely increased from 0.03 to 0.16, and the 
absolute value of the risk variable increased from 0.092 to 0.095. 
 
5.3.3. Elasticities 
If we exclude the price elasticities of demand calculated using the real price coefficient from 
the base model (regression 1), the price elasticities of demand for binge drinking range from -1.76 to 
-0.58 for the whole sample. For subsamples of male, female, white, and nonwhite high school 
seniors, they range from -1.24 to -0.51, from -2.22 to -0.98, from -3.37 to -0.12, and from -0.76 to    
-0.03 (except for regression 5), respectively. Overall, the price elasticities remain consistently greater 
than 1 in absolute value, except for nonwhite high school seniors. When comparing male and female 
high school seniors, their price elasticities of demand indicate that female high school seniors 
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respond more to changes in the real beer price than male high school seniors. It also seems to be 
clear that male and female high school seniors respond more to an increase in the real beer price 
when they associate binge drinking with a great risk of harm. When comparing white and nonwhite 
high school seniors, their price elasticities of demand clearly indicate that white high school seniors 
are more responsive to a real beer price increase than nonwhite high school seniors. Also, it is clear 
that white high school seniors respond more to an increase in the real beer price when they associate 
binge drinking with a great risk of harm. However, this conclusion cannot be reached for nonwhite 
high school seniors. 
 
5.4. Double log model 
As stated previously, the double log model yields regression coefficients that represent price 
elasticities of demand evaluated at the money price. I use these price elasticity estimates to 
corroborate the price elasticities of demand at the sample means obtained from the OLS model. 
Tables 19-23 show the results of double log estimations of the demand function for smoking 
based on the whole sample and subsamples of male, female, white, and nonwhite high school 
seniors. Tables 24-28 show the results of double log estimations of the demand function for 
drinking based on the whole sample and subsamples of male, female, white, and nonwhite high 
school seniors. Finally, Tables 29-33 show the results of a double log estimations of the demand 
function for binge drinking based on the whole sample and subsamples of male, female, white, and 
nonwhite high school seniors. For smoking, drinking, and binge drinking, the price elasticities of 
demand for the whole sample and subsamples are negative and significant (with only one exception). 
The price elasticity estimates obtained from this approach are slightly different than the price 
elasticities obtained from the OLS model. Depending on the regression specification, the price 
elasticities from the double log model are sometimes higher than the price elasticities of demand 
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obtained from the OLS model. In other instances, they are lower. In general terms, however, they 
are very similar to the ones obtained in the first approach. 
 
5.5. Predicted change in consumption 
One way to evaluate the results in the previous sections is to calculate how much of the 
change in consumption throughout a particular time period can be attributed to a change in price 
throughout the same time period. For this calculation, I multiply the real price coefficients obtained 
from the different regression specifications in the OLS model with the observed change in the real 
price from a specific period within 1976 and 2008. Estimates of how much of the change in 
consumption throughout a particular time period can be attributed to a change in risk perceptions 
during the same time period are calculated similarly. 
For cigarette consumption, I will emphasize two time periods: Period 1, from 1992 to 1997, 
and Period 2, from 1997 to 2008. Period 1 is particularly interesting because there is a decrease in 
the real cigarette price of 7 percent (see Figure 1). This decrease in the real cigarette price can be 
attributed to Phillip Morris Companies decreasing the nominal price of a pack of Marlboro 
cigarettes by 40 cents in April 1993. With this price cut, Phillip Morris Companies attempted to 
protect against newly-introduced generic cigarette brands. However, Phillip Morris Companies’ 
competitors hastily followed its strategy and decrease their prices. The resultant 7 percent decrease 
in the real cigarette price during this time period happened alongside with a 32 percent increase in 
cigarette consumption among high school seniors. For subsamples of male, female, white, and 
nonwhite high school seniors, cigarette consumption increased by 27, 37, 34, and 83 percent, 
respectively, during this time period. Conversely, Period 2 is interesting because it shows a sharp 
increase in real cigarette price of 75 percent (see Figure 1). This increase in real cigarette price is a 
response to the Master Settlement Agreement, which is a settlement of the lawsuits filed against 
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cigarette makers in order to recover Medicaid funds spent treating diseases associated to smoking. 
During Period 2, cigarette consumption decreased by 44 percent among high school seniors. For 
subsamples of male, female, white, and nonwhite high school seniors, the 75 percent increase in the 
real cigarette price can be responsible for a decrease in cigarette consumption of 42, 45, 43, and 13 
percent, respectively. 
For alcohol consumption and excessive alcohol consumption, I will emphasize only one 
period, from 1989 to 1992. During this time period, there was an increase in Federal tax rates, which 
disrupted a steady decrease in the real prices of beer. For alcohol consumption, this increase in 
Federal tax rates caused a 5 percent increase in the real price of beer after being adjusted to 
represent the cost of drinking (see section 4.1). At the same time, there was a 7 percent decrease in 
alcohol consumption among high school seniors. For subsamples of male, female, white, and 
nonwhite high school seniors there was a decrease in alcohol consumption of 8, 6, 8, and 5.3 percent, 
respectively. For excessive alcohol consumption, the same increase in Federal tax rates also caused a 
7 percent increase in the real price of beer after being adjusted to represent the cost of binge 
drinking (see section 4.1). At the same time, there was a 16 percent decrease in excessive alcohol 
consumption among high school seniors during this time period. For subsamples of male, female, 
white, and nonwhite high school seniors, there was a decrease in excessive alcohol consumption of 
14, 19, 16, and 37 percent, respectively. 
 
5.5.1. Predicted change in cigarette consumption 
Let’s start by discussing the results based on the whole sample. Panel A in Table 34 shows 
the change in cigarette consumption predicted by the different regression specifications of the OLS 
approach in Period 1. Regression 2 predicts an increase in cigarette consumption of 1.16 percentage 
points based on the real cigarette price reduction during this time period. Therefore, approximately 
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13 percent of the observed 8.9-percentage point increase in cigarette consumption during Period 1 is 
explained by the corresponding decrease in the real cigarette price. Regression 4, which adds the risk 
variable to regression 2, predicts an increase in cigarette consumption of 1.03 percentage points 
based on the observed reduction in real cigarette price during this period. This is approximately 12 
percent of the observed increase in cigarette smoking, and it explains 11 percent less of the observed 
increase in cigarette smoking when compared to regression 2, where risk is not included. As 
expected, real cigarette price explains less of the change in cigarette consumption when risk is 
included in the demand equation. In regression 3, risk is added to the demand equation and the real 
cigarette price is not included to allow for an indirect effect of price on consumption through the 
risk variable. This regression specification predicts a 0.13-percentage point increase in cigarette 
consumption explained by the decrease in risk perceptions during Period 1. This is approximately 
1.5 percent of the observed increase in cigarette consumption. 
Similarly, for subsamples of male and female high school seniors, we can see in regression 2 
that real price explains as much of the observed increase in cigarette consumption for male as for 
female high school seniors. For subsamples of white and nonwhite high school seniors, the results in 
the same regression specification imply that real price predicts more of the observed increase in 
cigarette consumption among white high school seniors than among nonwhite high school seniors. 
Moreover, as it was the case for the whole sample, real price explains less of the observed increase in 
cigarette consumption when the risk variable is added to the demand equation for all the subsamples. 
Panel B in Table 34 shows the change in cigarette consumption predicted by the different 
regression specifications of the first model in Period 2. Regression 2 predicts a decrease in cigarette 
consumption of 11.72 percentage points based on the price increase during this time period. 
Therefore, approximately 73 percent of the observed 16.14-percentage point decrease in cigarette 
consumption during Period 2 is due to the corresponding increase in the real cigarette price. 
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Regression 4 predicts a decrease in cigarette consumption of 10.31 percentage points based on the 
observed increase in real cigarette price during this period. This is approximately 64 percent of the 
observed decrease in cigarette smoking and it explains 12 percent less of the observed decrease in 
cigarette smoking when compared to regression 2, where risk is not included. As expected, price 
explains less of the change in cigarette consumption when risk is included in the demand equation. 
Regression 3 predicts a 4.35-percentage point decrease in cigarette consumption explained by the 
increase in risk perceptions during Period 2. This is approximately 27 percent of the observed 
decrease in cigarette consumption. 
For subsamples of male and female high school seniors, we can see in regression 2 that real 
cigarette price explains slightly more of the observed decrease in cigarette consumption among 
female high school seniors than among male high school seniors. For subsamples of white and 
nonwhite high school seniors, the results from the same regression specification imply that real 
cigarette price predicts more of the observed decrease in cigarette consumption among white high 
school seniors than among nonwhite high school seniors. Moreover, as it was the case when 
analyzing the results based on the whole sample, real cigarette price explains less of the observed 
decrease in cigarette consumption when the risk variable is added to the demand equation for all the 
subsamples. 
 
5.5.2. Predicted change in alcohol consumption 
Table 35 shows the change in alcohol consumption predicted by the different regression 
specifications of the OLS approach. From 1989 to 1992, alcohol consumption among high school 
seniors decreased by approximately 6 percentage points. Regression 2 predicts a decrease in alcohol 
consumption of 1.67 percentage points based on the real beer price increase during this time period. 
Thus, approximately 28 percent of the observed decrease in alcohol consumption during this period 
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is explained by the increase in the real beer price. Regression 4, where the risk variable is added to 
regression 2, predicts a decrease in alcohol consumption of 1.55 percentage points based on the real 
beer price increase during this period. This is 26 percent of the observed decrease in alcohol 
consumption. In regression 3, risk is added to the demand equation and the real beer price is not 
included to allow for an indirect effect of price on consumption through the risk variable. This 
regression specification predicts a 0.66-percentage point decrease in alcohol consumption explained 
by the increase in risk perceptions during this time period. This is approximately 11 percent of the 
decrease in alcohol consumption. 
For subsamples of male and female high school seniors, we can see in regression 2 that real 
beer price explains more of the observed decrease in alcohol consumption among male high school 
seniors than among female high school seniors. For subsamples of white and nonwhite high school 
seniors, the results in the same regression specification imply that real beer price predicts more of 
the observed decrease in alcohol consumption among white high school seniors than among 
nonwhite high school seniors. 
 
5.5.3. Predicted change in excessive alcohol consumption 
Table 36 shows the change in excessive alcohol consumption predicted by the different 
regression specifications of the first approach. From 1989 to 1992, excessive alcohol consumption 
among high school seniors decreased by 5.3 percentage points. Regression 2 predicts a decrease in 
excessive alcohol consumption of 3.75 percentage points based on the real beer price increase 
during this time period. Therefore, approximately 70 percent of the observed 5.3-percentage point 
decrease in excessive alcohol consumption is explained by the corresponding increase in the real 
beer price. Regression 4, which adds the risk variable to the specification in regression 2, predicts a 
decrease in excessive alcohol consumption of 3.01 percentage points based on the observed increase 
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in real beer price during this time period. This is approximately 56 percent of the observed increase 
in binge drinking, and it explains approximately 20 percent less of the observed increase in binge 
drinking when compared to regression 2, where risk is not included. As expected, real beer price 
explains less of the increase in excessive alcohol consumption when risk is included in the demand 
equation. In regression 3, risk is added to the demand equation and the real beer price is not 
included to allow for an indirect effect of price on consumption through the risk variable. This 
regression specification predicts a 2.81-percentage point decrease in excessive alcohol consumption 
explained by the increase in risk perceptions during this time period. This is approximately 53 
percent of the decrease in excessive alcohol consumption. 
For subsamples of male and female high school seniors, we can see in regression 2 that real 
beer price explains more of the observed decrease in excessive alcohol consumption among male 
high school seniors than among female high school seniors. For subsamples of white and nonwhite 
high school seniors, the results in the same regression specification imply that real beer price 
predicts more of the observed decrease in excessive alcohol consumption among white high school 
seniors than among nonwhite high school seniors. Moreover, as it was the case when analyzing the 
results based on the whole sample, real beer price explains less of the observed decrease in binge 
drinking when the risk variable is added to the demand equation for all the subsamples, except for 





Harmful and addictive goods such as cigarettes and alcohol are responsive to changes in 
their prices. Therefore, government policies that increase their nominal prices are effective methods 
to deter the consumption of these two goods. Particularly, smoking and binge drinking are activities 
of great public health concern because of their harmful nature and the external harm they impose on 
bystanders. Tables 34 and 36 evaluate the effects of price on smoking and binge drinking. These 
tables show the effects of price on cigarette consumption and excessive alcohol consumption by 
focusing on the change in smoking and binge drinking that is predicted by each different 
specification of the OLS model. In this study, albeit limited, I provide empirical proof that the 
percentage of high school seniors that smoke and binge drink consistently reduce when the real 
prices of these activities increase. Between 1992 and 1997, a decrease in the real cigarette price 
explains approximately 13 percent of the 8.9-percentage point increase in the percentage of high 
school seniors who smoked cigarettes. Between 1997 and 2008, a sharp increase in real cigarette 
price explains approximately 73 percent of the 16.1-percentage point decrease in the percentage of 
high school seniors who smoked cigarettes. The clear effect of real cigarette prices on smoking in 
both periods is still evident after controlling for individuals’ risk perceptions associated with 
smoking. After controlling for risk perceptions, the price variable explains more of the change in 
consumption than the risk variable. Furthermore, empirical results based on subsamples of male, 
female, white, and nonwhite high school seniors concur with these conclusions. 
The empirical results for excessive alcohol consumption also prove the relevance of price on 
consumption. Between 1989-1992, an increase in the real beer price, a proxy used for the cost of 
binge drinking, explains approximately 70 percent of the 5.3-percentage point decrease in the 
percentage of high school seniors who excessively drank alcoholic beverages. This effect of price on 
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binge drinking remains significant even after controlling for individuals’ risk perceptions associated 
with binge drinking. As was the case for cigarette consumption, price has a smaller effect on 
excessive alcohol consumption after controlling for risk perceptions, but the price variable seems to 
explain significantly more of the change in consumption than the risk variable. Subsamples of male, 
female, and white high school seniors yield results that support the same implications. 
Price elasticities of demand for smoking among high school seniors are consistent across 
specifications and they are fairly similar in the OLS and double log models. The price elasticities 
obtained from the double log model reinsures the implications of the OLS model. The OLS 
approach for cigarette consumption shows that price elasticities reduce, in absolute value, when the 
risk variable is included in the demand equation. Moreover, it is unclear who reacts more to a change 
in real cigarette price, male or female high school seniors. However, the OLS approach shows clear 
results indicating that nonwhite high school seniors are more susceptible to real cigarette price 
changes than white high school seniors.  
With only few exceptions, the OLS approach for excessive alcohol consumption shows price 
elasticities of demand for excessive alcohol consumption that are greater than 1 in absolute value. 
Also price elasticities reduce, in absolute value, when the risk variable is included in the regression. 
Furthermore, it is clear that female high school seniors are more susceptible to a change in real beer 
price than male high school seniors. Analogously, white high school seniors seem to react more to a 
change in real beer price then nonwhite high school seniors.  
These results advocate for the use of taxes to increase the nominal price of cigarettes and 
alcohol and therefore deter their consumption. Attitudinal effects such as the effect of risk 
perceptions should not be underestimated because they also have a significant effect on cigarette and 
alcohol consumption. In particular, they have more prominent effects on smoking and binge 
drinking. Furthermore, greater awareness of the risks associated with smoking and binge drinking 
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clearly strengthen the effect of real price on consumption for high school seniors in general and for 
male, female, white, and nonwhite high school seniors. For drinking however, this effect is clear for 






Table 1 - Summary Statistics for Cigarette Consumption 
High School Seniors  
      Great Risk  No Great Risk 
 Mean S.D. Min. Max.  Mean S.D. Min. Max.  Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
 Smoking  29.93 4.67 20.50 38.77  22.72 3.90 15.04 29.36  45.13 4.49 36.33 53.96 
 Real Price  135.25 49.95 76.46 221.57  135.25 49.95 76.46 221.57  135.25 49.95 76.46 221.57 
 Risk  69.07 5.66 57.42 78.66           
 Real Income  49.19 7.92 35.98 68.18  47.89 7.75 34.51 67.55  52.87 8.20 35.80 72.74 
 Father's Education  51.31 6.18 36.81 59.11  53.99 5.81 42.97 62.03  46.11 5.98 31.68 53.89 
 Mother's Education  49.33 10.21 30.51 62.07  51.31 9.98 33.43 65.55  45.21 10.75 26.18 61.26 
 Mother's Employment  52.55 11.86 31.51 68.09  53.56 12.21 32.45 69.34  53.68 11.92 31.59 71.76 
Male High School Seniors 
 Smoking  29.52 4.48 21.56 37.78  22.02 3.93 14.90 32.14  44.73 5.58 35.25 56.53 
 Real Price  135.25 49.95 76.46 221.57  135.25 49.95 76.46 221.57  135.25 49.95 76.46 221.57 
 Risk  66.38 4.61 56.35 74.95           
 Real Income  53.83 10.39 38.19 79.20  52.40 10.08 37.60 78.00  57.36 10.91 38.26 83.72 
 Father's Education  53.04 6.48 37.12 60.61  55.91 6.15 43.96 65.68  47.95 6.44 33.56 59.52 
 Mother's Education  50.49 10.64 30.11 63.86  52.81 10.58 33.50 68.41  46.03 11.50 25.80 63.92 
 Mother's Employment  51.35 11.99 30.22 67.18  52.57 12.24 30.77 69.06  52.23 12.32 29.88 71.60 
Female High School Seniors 
 Smoking  29.79 5.42 19.24 39.91  23.30 4.62 13.47 31.50  45.26 4.46 36.93 53.89 
 Real Price  135.25 49.95 76.46 221.57  135.25 49.95 76.46 221.57  135.25 49.95 76.46 221.57 
 Risk  72.05 7.11 58.59 83.85           
 Real Income  44.63 5.69 33.76 57.78  43.66 5.53 31.84 56.39  47.84 6.13 33.42 61.08 
 Father's Education  50.00 6.06 36.70 57.88  52.51 5.81 41.58 59.83  44.04 6.42 29.81 55.81 
 Mother's Education  48.46 9.98 30.91 60.97  50.29 9.71 33.37 63.42  44.20 10.20 25.20 59.29 






Table 1 - (continuation) 
White High School Seniors  
      Great Risk  No Great Risk 
 Mean S.D. Min. Max.  Mean S.D. Min. Max.  Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
 Smoking  32.95 4.58 24.30 42.48  24.76 4.22 17.36 34.73  50.04 4.63 41.84 63.06 
 Real Price  135.25 49.95 76.46 221.57  135.25 49.95 76.46 221.57  135.25 49.95 76.46 221.57 
 Risk  68.52 5.56 57.30 78.25           
 Real Income  48.98 8.03 35.95 69.09  47.26 7.90 34.25 67.79  53.41 8.13 35.95 75.03 
 Father's Education  55.14 6.66 39.53 62.84  58.26 6.29 46.77 66.05  48.70 6.65 33.44 60.56 
 Mother's Education  51.97 10.94 32.41 66.86  54.33 10.73 35.37 72.35  47.15 11.64 27.27 66.50 
 Mother's Employment  49.76 12.95 27.29 66.33  50.27 13.16 28.13 67.80  51.92 13.26 26.31 72.07 
Nonwhite High School Seniors 
 Smoking  16.64 7.56 8.19 39.57  14.03 7.57 5.07 37.22  23.99 9.04 8.46 41.48 
 Real Price  135.25 49.95 76.46 221.57  135.25 49.95 76.46 221.57  135.25 49.95 76.46 221.57 
 Risk  72.12 6.14 57.48 80.56           
 Real Income  50.75 6.19 37.05 63.04  51.18 7.28 35.81 68.24  51.21 8.43 37.49 76.85 
 Father's Education  36.45 8.18 20.32 49.00  37.82 8.92 20.08 56.43  35.10 9.11 14.16 56.26 
 Mother's Education  44.77 11.29 23.24 60.25  45.32 11.78 19.78 63.23  42.31 12.43 18.02 63.78 
 Mother's Employment  71.54 7.42 55.62 80.55  73.57 7.57 58.32 86.29  70.44 7.76 49.89 85.15 








Table 2 - Summary Statistics for Alcohol Consumption 
High School Seniors 
      Great Risk  No Great Risk 
 Mean S.D. Min. Max.  Mean S.D. Min. Max.  Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Drinking 78.33 7.56 65.42 88.06  63.36 11.95 42.54 80.11  83.99 6.46 72.33 92.47 
Real Price 97.78 7.12 88.34 117.84  97.78 7.12 88.34 117.84  97.78 7.12 88.34 117.84 
Risk 24.58 3.43 18.84 33.54           
Real Income 49.19 7.92 35.98 68.18  47.51 7.53 32.71 66.05  50.11 8.29 35.42 70.74 
Legal Age 20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00  20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00  20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00 
Father's Education 51.31 6.18 36.81 59.11  51.73 5.90 39.19 60.77  51.53 6.34 37.54 59.68 
Mother's Education 49.33 10.21 30.51 62.07  49.24 9.34 31.47 62.91  49.44 10.97 30.23 64.91 
Mother's Employment 52.55 11.86 31.51 68.09  53.03 11.70 29.52 69.46  53.76 12.29 32.33 69.89 
Male High School Seniors 
Drinking 79.40 8.13 65.40 89.91  59.53 15.25 32.36 82.27  85.29 6.73 72.49 94.30 
Real Price 97.78 7.12 88.34 117.84  97.78 7.12 88.34 117.84  97.78 7.12 88.34 117.84 
Risk 19.57 2.65 14.86 24.79           
Real Income 53.83 10.39 38.19 79.20  52.45 9.66 37.10 74.90  54.54 10.71 38.10 81.62 
Legal Age 20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00  20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00  20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00 
Father's Education 53.04 6.48 37.12 60.61  53.44 6.03 41.98 66.42  53.09 6.51 37.95 61.72 
Mother's Education 50.49 10.64 30.11 63.86  50.04 10.09 30.05 66.83  50.56 11.50 29.88 67.93 
Mother's Employment 51.35 11.99 30.22 67.18  51.21 11.93 24.79 72.78  52.80 12.44 30.10 68.80 
Female High School Seniors 
Drinking 77.29 7.09 65.54 86.48  65.51 10.41 46.49 79.99  82.68 6.20 71.88 91.34 
Real Price 97.78 7.12 88.34 117.84  97.78 7.12 88.34 117.84  97.78 7.12 88.34 117.84 
Risk 29.28 4.60 21.09 42.66           
Real Income 44.63 5.69 33.76 57.78  44.23 6.26 30.19 58.34  45.13 5.92 33.00 58.42 
Legal Age 20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00  20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00  20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00 
Father's Education 50.00 6.06 36.70 57.88  50.74 6.46 37.46 59.31  50.03 6.32 37.52 57.50 
Mother's Education 48.46 9.98 30.91 60.97  49.05 9.31 31.84 63.28  48.40 10.58 29.57 62.15 





Table 2 (continuation) 
White High School Seniors 
      Great Risk  No Great Risk 
 Mean S.D. Min. Max.  Mean S.D. Min. Max.  Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Drinking 81.55 7.31 69.17 90.36  65.63 12.75 44.32 81.35  86.63 6.14 75.69 94.28 
Real Price 97.78 7.12 88.34 117.84  97.78 7.12 88.34 117.84  97.78 7.12 88.34 117.84 
Risk 22.18 3.60 15.55 31.71           
Real Income 48.98 8.03 35.95 69.09  46.59 7.99 30.16 65.31  50.00 8.25 36.05 72.01 
Legal Age 20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00  20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00  20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00 
Father's Education 55.14 6.66 39.53 62.84  56.81 6.90 41.45 69.56  54.91 6.85 40.99 63.90 
Mother's Education 51.97 10.94 32.41 66.86  52.45 10.33 34.63 71.21  51.87 11.66 31.99 70.46 
Mother's Employment 49.76 12.95 27.29 66.33  48.48 12.23 24.53 64.48  51.40 13.32 27.88 68.68 
Nonwhite High School Seniors 
Drinking 64.60 6.05 55.31 74.34  55.42 10.22 34.59 74.80  71.14 6.74 56.67 83.64 
Real Price 97.78 7.12 88.34 117.84  97.78 7.12 88.34 117.84  97.78 7.12 88.34 117.84 
Risk 34.03 5.69 23.42 47.82           
Real Income 50.75 6.19 37.05 63.04  51.71 7.52 37.43 67.36  51.00 7.48 34.41 71.91 
Legal Age 20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00  20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00  20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00 
Father's Education 36.45 8.18 20.32 49.00  38.64 10.10 17.97 60.06  36.12 8.21 17.25 48.50 
Mother's Education 44.77 11.29 23.24 60.25  45.14 12.48 21.36 65.19  44.48 11.70 24.73 63.93 
Mother's Employment 71.54 7.42 55.62 80.55  71.28 9.01 46.69 86.72  73.50 7.54 57.06 86.03 






Table 3 - Summary Statistics for Excessive Alcohol Consumption 
High School Seniors 
      Great Risk  No Great Risk 
 Mean S.D. Min. Max.  Mean S.D. Min. Max.  Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Binge Drinking 32.95 5.38 24.78 41.37  16.15 3.81 10.77 22.07  46.42 5.49 38.58 54.77 
Real Price 97.27 6.53 88.75 115.08  97.27 6.53 88.75 115.08  97.27 6.53 88.75 115.08 
Risk 43.14 4.59 34.96 50.29           
Real Income 49.19 7.92 35.98 68.18  46.77 7.29 33.69 65.14  51.49 8.43 35.79 72.39 
Legal Age 20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00  20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00  20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00 
Father's Education 51.31 6.18 36.81 59.11  50.88 6.46 39.39 59.55  52.08 6.25 37.00 60.63 
Mother's Education 49.33 10.21 30.51 62.07  48.90 10.25 31.29 65.11  49.84 10.92 29.59 66.35 
Mother's Employment 52.55 11.86 31.51 68.09  54.30 11.84 32.09 69.34  53.09 12.28 30.95 70.22 
Male High School Seniors 
Binge Drinking 40.71 7.26 28.53 52.15  19.48 6.31 10.92 30.67  53.11 6.53 43.55 65.15 
Real Price 97.27 6.53 88.75 115.08  97.27 6.53 88.75 115.08  97.27 6.53 88.75 115.08 
Risk 36.21 4.13 28.39 42.35           
Real Income 53.83 10.39 38.19 79.20  51.69 9.52 36.28 76.13  55.52 10.77 38.50 82.55 
Legal Age 20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00  20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00  20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00 
Father's Education 53.04 6.48 37.12 60.61  53.14 6.84 40.38 63.65  53.18 6.39 38.12 62.78 
Mother's Education 50.49 10.64 30.11 63.86  50.38 10.77 31.30 66.29  50.61 11.60 28.92 68.55 
Mother's Employment 51.35 11.99 30.22 67.18  53.07 11.97 29.10 68.77  52.15 12.50 28.60 70.16 
Female High School Seniors 
Binge Drinking 25.27 3.64 20.17 31.07  13.56 2.57 9.23 18.81  38.34 4.63 30.11 47.60 
Real Price 97.27 6.53 88.75 115.08  97.27 6.53 88.75 115.08  97.27 6.53 88.75 115.08 
Risk 49.72 5.18 39.34 59.60           
Real Income 44.63 5.69 33.76 57.78  43.22 5.87 31.23 56.46  46.47 5.95 33.11 59.51 
Legal Age 20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00  20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00  20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00 
Father's Education 50.00 6.06 36.70 57.88  49.55 6.71 37.40 59.28  50.88 6.20 36.30 60.16 
Mother's Education 48.46 9.98 30.91 60.97  48.13 10.19 30.95 64.72  49.04 10.36 29.72 64.83 





Table 3 (continuation) 
White High School Seniors 
      Great Risk  No Great Risk 
 Mean S.D. Min. Max.  Mean S.D. Min. Max.  Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Binge Drinking 36.75 5.10 29.13 45.24  17.57 4.08 10.95 24.27  50.38 4.93 42.86 58.11 
Real Price 97.27 6.53 88.75 115.08  97.27 6.53 88.75 115.08  97.27 6.53 88.75 115.08 
Risk 40.03 4.53 32.58 47.76           
Real Income 48.98 8.03 35.95 69.09  45.89 7.48 32.49 65.34  51.45 8.37 36.61 73.46 
Legal Age 20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00  20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00  20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00 
Father's Education 55.14 6.66 39.53 62.84  55.51 7.13 43.61 67.41  55.21 6.82 39.72 65.40 
Mother's Education 51.97 10.94 32.41 66.86  51.67 11.00 32.38 68.78  52.32 11.67 31.35 71.96 
Mother's Employment 49.76 12.95 27.29 66.33  50.12 13.04 25.66 66.27  51.22 13.19 28.00 70.16 
Nonwhite High School Seniors 
Binge Drinking 15.02 2.91 10.33 20.02  9.63 3.42 1.77 15.11  23.88 5.18 12.58 36.76 
Real Price 97.27 6.53 88.75 115.08  97.27 6.53 88.75 115.08  97.27 6.53 88.75 115.08 
Risk 57.78 4.54 47.16 65.88           
Real Income 50.75 6.19 37.05 63.04  50.47 6.61 36.52 65.40  52.25 8.32 35.61 75.94 
Legal Age 20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00  20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00  20.41 0.82 18.92 21.00 
Father's Education 36.45 8.18 20.32 49.00  36.82 8.65 18.62 55.21  37.25 9.88 13.48 57.64 
Mother's Education 44.77 11.29 23.24 60.25  45.02 11.34 24.12 61.18  44.23 13.23 20.32 65.96 
Mother's Employment 71.54 7.42 55.62 80.55  72.82 7.89 55.29 86.77  72.58 8.33 52.40 85.88 





Table 4 - Cigarette Consumption OLS Regressions, High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 
  Smoking Smoking Smoking Smoking Smoking Smoking 
       
Real Price -0.124*** -0.125***  -0.110*** -0.107*** -0.077 
 [0.014] [0.014]  [0.019] [0.018] [0.047] 
Time -3.997*** -3.950*** -1.852 -2.967*** -2.581*** -4.167*** 
 [0.288] [0.592] [1.547] [0.613] [0.446] [0.804] 
Time Squared 0.272*** 0.253*** 0.138*** 0.217*** 0.224*** 0.258*** 
 [0.019] [0.025] [0.030] [0.023] [0.022] [0.038] 
Time Cubed -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
Risk   -0.769*** -0.278*   
   [0.259] [0.141]   
Real Income  0.175*** 0.290** 0.234*** 0.198* 0.216** 
  [0.031] [0.132] [0.047] [0.105] [0.081] 
Father's Education  0.317 0.049 0.044 -0.319 0.259 
  [0.347] [0.818] [0.352] [0.256] [0.197] 
Mother's Education  -0.545 0.189 -0.203 0.249 -0.116 
  [0.329] [0.636] [0.308] [0.211] [0.320] 
Mother's Employment  0.484* 0.044 0.248 -0.214 0.224 
  [0.245] [0.457] [0.225] [0.197] [0.368] 
       
Price Elasticityc -0.560 -0.564  -0.497 -0.634 -0.231 
Income Elasticityd  0.287 0.477 0.384 0.417 0.253 
R-sq 0.932 0.951 0.898 0.956 0.880 0.721 
F-Statistic 95.699 58.424 26.410 54.951 21.930 7.736 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of high school seniors who consider smoking a great risk. 
 
b Regression based on a subsample of high school seniors who do not consider smoking a great risk. 
 
c Price elasticities are evaluated at the mean values. 
 




Table 5 - Cigarette Consumption OLS Regressions, Male High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 
  Smoking Smoking Smoking Smoking Smoking Smoking 
       
Real Price -0.125*** -0.124***  -0.119*** -0.136*** -0.107** 
 [0.020] [0.018]  [0.019] [0.027] [0.045] 
Time -4.397*** -5.340*** -4.096** -4.539*** -2.825*** -5.426*** 
 [0.314] [0.502] [1.784] [0.752] [0.803] [0.975] 
Time Squared 0.314*** 0.313*** 0.232*** 0.283*** 0.238*** 0.357*** 
 [0.019] [0.020] [0.042] [0.025] [0.039] [0.039] 
Time Cubed -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.006*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
Risk   -0.318* -0.142   
   [0.169] [0.126]   
Real Income  0.081 0.131 0.143 0.191** 0.146 
  [0.057] [0.145] [0.088] [0.077] [0.137] 
Father's Education  0.665** 0.787 0.506 -0.241 0.147 
  [0.244] [0.634] [0.313] [0.288] [0.134] 
Mother's Education  -0.689*** -0.409 -0.530** 0.037 0.029 
  [0.224] [0.400] [0.253] [0.289] [0.233] 
Mother's Employment  0.739*** 0.390 0.593** 0.140 0.199 
  [0.260] [0.569] [0.254] [0.143] [0.279] 
       
Price Elasticityc -0.573 -0.567  -0.545 -0.838 -0.322 
Income Elasticityd  0.149 0.239 0.260 0.454 0.187 
R-sq 0.903 0.930 0.843 0.932 0.743 0.722 
F-Statistic 65.045 39.602 16.164 35.285 8.692 7.796 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of male high school seniors who consider smoking a great risk. 
 
b Regression based on a subsample of male high school seniors who do not consider smoking a great risk. 
 
c Price elasticities are evaluated at the mean values. 
 




Table 6 - Cigarette Consumption OLS Regressions, Female High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 
  Smoking Smoking Smoking Smoking Smoking Smoking 
       
Real Price -0.120*** -0.125***  -0.098*** -0.092*** -0.110** 
 [0.015] [0.014]  [0.021] [0.017] [0.044] 
Time -3.549*** -2.672*** -1.297* -1.871** -2.673*** -2.037*** 
 [0.414] [0.530] [0.658] [0.741] [0.270] [0.657] 
Time Squared 0.228*** 0.194*** 0.121*** 0.171*** 0.210*** 0.153** 
 [0.027] [0.025] [0.021] [0.026] [0.016] [0.055] 
Time Cubed -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.002** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
Risk   -0.751*** -0.371**   
   [0.121] [0.172]   
Real Income  0.289*** 0.274*** 0.283*** 0.302** 0.203 
  [0.063] [0.076] [0.060] [0.137] [0.124] 
Father's Education  -0.346 -0.299 -0.366 -0.126 -0.009 
  [0.316] [0.527] [0.354] [0.180] [0.202] 
Mother's Education  0.044 0.324 0.151 0.081 -0.047 
  [0.367] [0.484] [0.388] [0.144] [0.214] 
Mother's Employment  0.101 -0.113 -0.106 -0.207 -0.183 
  [0.270] [0.280] [0.315] [0.189] [0.170] 
       
Price Elasticityc -0.547 -0.569  -0.443 -0.532 -0.328 
Income Elasticityd  0.434 0.411 0.425 0.565 0.214 
R-sq 0.924 0.950 0.926 0.959 0.906 0.546 
F-Statistic 85.178 56.680 37.726 59.272 28.857 3.604 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of female high school seniors who consider smoking a great risk. 
 
b Regression based on a subsample of female high school seniors who do not consider smoking a great risk. 
 
c Price elasticities are evaluated at the mean values. 
 




Table 7 - Cigarette Consumption OLS Regressions, White High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 
  Smoking Smoking Smoking Smoking Smoking Smoking 
       
Real Price -0.146*** -0.150***  -0.124*** -0.113*** -0.117** 
 [0.019] [0.023]  [0.025] [0.027] [0.048] 
Time -3.899*** -3.529*** -0.943 -2.531*** -2.088*** -3.352*** 
 [0.315] [0.658] [1.342] [0.726] [0.532] [0.568] 
Time Squared 0.293*** 0.269*** 0.149*** 0.229*** 0.237*** 0.276*** 
 [0.021] [0.032] [0.031] [0.038] [0.024] [0.038] 
Time Cubed -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Risk   -0.855*** -0.300   
   [0.232] [0.186]   
Real Income  0.159*** 0.283** 0.219*** 0.294** 0.162 
  [0.052] [0.115] [0.067] [0.113] [0.104] 
Father's Education  0.103 -0.134 -0.076 -0.122 0.071 
  [0.388] [0.603] [0.405] [0.209] [0.176] 
Mother's Education  -0.199 0.484 0.060 0.177 -0.256 
  [0.358] [0.559] [0.383] [0.199] [0.250] 
Mother's Employment  0.198 -0.474 -0.025 -0.385 0.037 
  [0.305] [0.492] [0.240] [0.234] [0.151] 
       
Price Elasticityc -0.598 -0.615  -0.511 -0.619 -0.316 
Income Elasticityd  0.236 0.421 0.325 0.561 0.173 
R-sq 0.909 0.922 0.866 0.929 0.892 0.665 
F-Statistic 70.317 35.615 19.398 33.581 24.698 5.946 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of white high school seniors who consider smoking a great risk. 
 
b Regression based on a subsample of white high school seniors who do not consider smoking a great risk. 
 
c Price elasticities are evaluated at the mean values. 
 




Table 8 - Cigarette Consumption OLS Regressions, Nonwhite High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 
  Smoking Smoking Smoking Smoking Smoking Smoking 
       
Real Price -0.096*** -0.092***  -0.078*** -0.069** -0.090 
 [0.016] [0.015]  [0.017] [0.033] [0.093] 
Time -5.196*** -4.909*** -3.619*** -4.426*** -4.947*** -4.637*** 
 [0.273] [0.240] [0.375] [0.346] [0.565] [1.020] 
Time Squared 0.245*** 0.251*** 0.167*** 0.223*** 0.224*** 0.237*** 
 [0.018] [0.018] [0.029] [0.022] [0.047] [0.079] 
Time Cubed -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003* 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.002] 
Risk   -0.296*** -0.175***   
   [0.057] [0.051]   
Real Income  0.100 0.191 0.141 0.054 0.099 
  [0.081] [0.118] [0.092] [0.149] [0.132] 
Father's Education  0.095 0.319 0.142 0.132 0.300 
  [0.246] [0.268] [0.239] [0.192] [0.244] 
Mother's Education  -0.209 -0.221 -0.215 0.015 -0.529*** 
  [0.233] [0.229] [0.205] [0.118] [0.145] 
Mother's Employment  -0.053 -0.238** -0.067 -0.081 0.145 
  [0.114] [0.103] [0.088] [0.116] [0.247] 
       
Price Elasticityc -0.782 -0.749  -0.637 -0.662 -0.509 
Income Elasticityd  0.304 0.581 0.430 0.198 0.211 
R-sq 0.972 0.977 0.968 0.980 0.876 0.631 
F-Statistic 246.896 124.824 89.819 122.529 21.274 5.136 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of nonwhite high school seniors who consider smoking a great risk. 
 
b Regression based on a subsample of nonwhite high school seniors who do not consider smoking a great risk. 
 
c Price elasticities are evaluated at the mean values. 
 




Table 9 - Alcohol Consumption OLS Regressions, High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 
  Drinking Drinking Drinking Drinking Drinking Drinking 
       
Real Price -0.448*** -0.340***  -0.316*** -0.234 -0.266*** 
 [0.089] [0.082]  [0.073] [0.311] [0.060] 
Time -0.846* 1.778** 3.706*** 2.104** 2.758 -0.159 
 [0.491] [0.827] [0.707] [0.849] [1.636] [0.653] 
Time Squared -0.017 -0.101*** -0.200*** -0.128*** -0.171*** -0.039 
 [0.028] [0.034] [0.037] [0.042] [0.054] [0.024] 
Time Cubed 0.000 0.001* 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003*** 0.001 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
Risk   -0.352** -0.314*   
   [0.164] [0.165]   
Legal Age  -0.084 2.630 3.225* -1.375 0.669 
  [1.430] [2.343] [1.736] [3.692] [0.899] 
Real Income  0.217** 0.344*** 0.217** 0.109 0.132 
  [0.090] [0.100] [0.089] [0.146] [0.098] 
Father's Education  -1.433*** -1.505*** -1.398*** -0.152 -0.328 
  [0.334] [0.391] [0.343] [0.356] [0.232] 
Mother's Education  1.331*** 1.130** 1.226*** 0.093 0.359*** 
  [0.362] [0.410] [0.306] [0.239] [0.100] 
Mother's Employment  -0.703** -0.580* -0.783** -0.572** -0.088 
  [0.292] [0.309] [0.286] [0.235] [0.146] 
       
Price Elasticityc -0.559 -0.424  -0.394 -0.361 -0.310 
Income Elasticityd  0.136 0.216 0.136 0.081 0.079 
R-sq 0.969 0.985 0.983 0.988 0.952 0.979 
F-Statistic 220.380 164.940 147.203 176.934 50.888 117.408 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of high school seniors who consider drinking a great risk. 
 
b Regression based on a subsample of high school seniors who do not consider drinking a great risk. 
 
c Price elasticities are evaluated at the mean values. 
 




Table 10 - Alcohol Consumption OLS Regressions, Male High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 
  Drinking Drinking Drinking Drinking Drinking Drinking 
       
Real Price -0.509*** -0.385***  -0.375*** -0.144 -0.483*** 
 [0.086] [0.079]  [0.091] [0.443] [0.089] 
Time -1.486*** 1.496 3.865*** 1.614 3.537 -1.299 
 [0.463] [1.091] [1.118] [1.141] [2.270] [0.851] 
Time Squared 0.016 -0.060 -0.159*** -0.072 -0.229** 0.025 
 [0.026] [0.041] [0.046] [0.051] [0.102] [0.029] 
Time Cubed -0.000 0.000 0.002** 0.001 0.004* -0.001 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.000] 
Risk   -0.242 -0.180   
   [0.274] [0.238]   
Legal Age  -0.541 -0.345 0.816 -4.890* 0.137 
  [1.528] [3.306] [2.163] [2.797] [1.018] 
Real Income  0.175** 0.293** 0.173** 0.171 0.075 
  [0.084] [0.120] [0.083] [0.164] [0.095] 
Father's Education  -0.963** -1.055** -0.920** -0.128 -0.099 
  [0.374] [0.453] [0.393] [0.303] [0.219] 
Mother's Education  0.727*** 0.698** 0.708** -0.254 0.186 
  [0.252] [0.329] [0.264] [0.294] [0.151] 
Mother's Employment  -0.725*** -0.775*** -0.786*** -0.142 -0.086 
  [0.239] [0.262] [0.259] [0.090] [0.175] 
       
Price Elasticityc -0.627 -0.475  -0.461 -0.237 -0.553 
Income Elasticityd  0.118 0.198 0.117 0.151 0.048 
R-sq 0.971 0.981 0.974 0.982 0.942 0.956 
F-Statistic 235.079 132.657 97.395 118.070 41.834 55.049 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of male high school seniors who consider drinking a great risk. 
 
b Regression based on a subsample of male high school seniors who do not consider drinking a great risk. 
 
c Price elasticities are evaluated at the mean values. 
 




Table 11 - Alcohol Consumption OLS Regressions, Female High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 
  Drinking Drinking Drinking Drinking Drinking Drinking 
       
Real Price -0.368*** -0.252  -0.274** -0.192 0.014 
 [0.098] [0.152]  [0.129] [0.305] [0.115] 
Time -0.160 1.303 2.543*** 1.442 0.882 1.205* 
 [0.552] [1.050] [0.610] [0.913] [1.573] [0.681] 
Time Squared -0.052 -0.103* -0.173*** -0.119** -0.125** -0.103*** 
 [0.032] [0.052] [0.034] [0.049] [0.059] [0.023] 
Time Cubed 0.001* 0.001 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002* 0.002*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
Risk   -0.229** -0.245**   
   [0.093] [0.088]   
Legal Age  -0.816 1.693 2.706 -1.095 0.810 
  [1.503] [2.064] [1.599] [3.919] [1.081] 
Real Income  0.228 0.295** 0.186 0.050 0.226** 
  [0.138] [0.109] [0.118] [0.175] [0.105] 
Father's Education  -0.784* -0.903* -0.771* -0.166 -0.398** 
  [0.449] [0.450] [0.444] [0.254] [0.191] 
Mother's Education  0.918** 0.835* 0.823** 0.478* 0.260* 
  [0.413] [0.422] [0.343] [0.243] [0.127] 
Mother's Employment  -0.397 -0.304 -0.522 -0.050 -0.063 
  [0.316] [0.281] [0.305] [0.232] [0.175] 
       
Price Elasticityc -0.465 -0.318  -0.347 -0.287 0.017 
Income Elasticityd  0.132 0.170 0.107 0.034 0.124 
R-sq 0.957 0.971 0.971 0.975 0.921 0.959 
F-Statistic 154.162 84.253 86.729 85.962 29.972 59.527 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of female high school seniors who consider drinking a great risk. 
 
b Regression based on a subsample of female high school seniors who do not consider drinking a great risk. 
 
c Price elasticities are evaluated at the mean values. 
 




Table 12 - Alcohol Consumption OLS Regressions, White High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 
  Drinking Drinking Drinking Drinking Drinking Drinking 
       
Real Price -0.455*** -0.333***  -0.312*** -0.277 -0.240*** 
 [0.098] [0.099]  [0.085] [0.302] [0.084] 
Time -0.452 2.467** 4.529*** 2.905*** 3.824* 0.115 
 [0.550] [1.099] [0.797] [0.994] [2.152] [0.720] 
Time Squared -0.037 -0.130** -0.233*** -0.154** -0.267** -0.041 
 [0.031] [0.053] [0.046] [0.057] [0.097] [0.036] 
Time Cubed 0.001 0.002* 0.003*** 0.002** 0.004** 0.001 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
Risk   -0.441** -0.421*   
   [0.213] [0.216]   
Legal Age  0.401 4.884 5.196** 2.520 -0.180 
  [2.027] [2.853] [2.231] [4.446] [1.271] 
Real Income  0.277* 0.357*** 0.243** 0.237 0.122 
  [0.135] [0.116] [0.103] [0.162] [0.112] 
Father's Education  -1.167*** -1.298*** -1.162*** -0.398 -0.223 
  [0.394] [0.356] [0.330] [0.388] [0.182] 
Mother's Education  1.000** 0.795* 0.883** 0.051 0.380*** 
  [0.413] [0.406] [0.342] [0.291] [0.109] 
Mother's Employment  -0.667** -0.722** -0.940** -0.441 -0.164 
  [0.277] [0.320] [0.365] [0.328] [0.157] 
       
Price Elasticityc -0.546 -0.399  -0.374 -0.412 -0.271 
Income Elasticityd  0.167 0.214 0.146 0.168 0.070 
R-sq 0.952 0.973 0.975 0.980 0.940 0.967 
F-Statistic 140.258 92.116 99.258 105.267 39.740 73.873 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of white high school seniors who consider drinking a great risk. 
 
b Regression based on a subsample of white high school seniors who do not consider drinking a great risk. 
 
c Price elasticities are evaluated at the mean values. 
 




Table 13 - Alcohol Consumption OLS Regressions, Nonwhite High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 
  Drinking Drinking Drinking Drinking Drinking Drinking 
       
Real Price 0.046 -0.001  -0.018 0.196 -0.115 
 [0.110] [0.220]  [0.208] [0.430] [0.337] 
Time 0.361 0.666 0.540 0.463 -0.608 -0.495 
 [0.393] [0.931] [0.363] [0.837] [2.267] [1.451] 
Time Squared -0.079*** -0.070** -0.065*** -0.062** -0.030 -0.017 
 [0.021] [0.032] [0.022] [0.029] [0.092] [0.061] 
Time Cubed 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001 0.001 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
Risk   -0.082 -0.083*   
   [0.052] [0.047]   
Legal Age  -0.368 0.657 0.773 -0.447 1.657 
  [2.098] [1.234] [1.643] [5.095] [3.198] 
Real Income  0.011 0.024 0.019 -0.072 0.248** 
  [0.123] [0.091] [0.129] [0.194] [0.120] 
Father's Education  0.232 0.197 0.192 -0.170 0.471*** 
  [0.212] [0.215] [0.241] [0.342] [0.161] 
Mother's Education  -0.184 -0.214 -0.206 0.373* -0.457** 
  [0.363] [0.311] [0.379] [0.217] [0.200] 
Mother's Employment  -0.247 -0.198 -0.204 -0.139 -0.171 
  [0.250] [0.217] [0.269] [0.226] [0.235] 
       
Price Elasticityc 0.070 -0.002  -0.028 0.346 -0.158 
Income Elasticityd  0.008 0.019 0.015 -0.067 0.178 
R-sq 0.926 0.939 0.942 0.942 0.717 0.707 
F-Statistic 87.737 39.606 41.348 35.615 6.481 6.160 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of nonwhite high school seniors who consider drinking a great risk. 
 
b Regression based on a subsample of nonwhite high school seniors who do not consider drinking a great risk. 
 
c Price elasticities are evaluated at the mean values. 
 




Table 14 - Excessive Alcohol Consumption OLS Regressions, High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 
  Binging Binging Binging Binging Binging Binging 
       
Real Price -0.765*** -0.564***  -0.453*** -0.292** -0.276** 
 [0.082] [0.049]  [0.087] [0.113] [0.131] 
Time -2.192*** 0.217 1.761*** 0.267 0.565 0.389 
 [0.370] [0.548] [0.464] [0.393] [0.693] [1.108] 
Time squared 0.055** -0.000 -0.082*** -0.011 -0.053 -0.005 
 [0.022] [0.017] [0.019] [0.012] [0.035] [0.033] 
Time cubed -0.001* -0.000 0.001*** -0.000 0.001 -0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
Risk   -0.488*** -0.248**   
   [0.118] [0.096]   
Legal Age  -5.604*** -4.315** -4.351*** -2.069 -7.049*** 
  [0.636] [1.556] [0.605] [1.523] [1.023] 
Real Income  0.067 0.055 0.004 0.046 -0.071 
  [0.050] [0.097] [0.043] [0.125] [0.075] 
Father's Education  -0.529** -0.133 -0.317 0.170 0.343 
  [0.241] [0.301] [0.247] [0.197] [0.205] 
Mother's Education  0.727** 0.293 0.565* -0.230 0.070 
  [0.277] [0.383] [0.280] [0.190] [0.089] 
Mother's Employment  -0.477** -0.152 -0.401** 0.057 -0.395* 
  [0.216] [0.179] [0.191] [0.120] [0.214] 
       
Price Elasticityc -2.258 -1.666  -1.337 -1.762 -0.579 
Income Elasticityd  0.100 0.082 0.006 0.134 -0.079 
R-sq 0.941 0.983 0.971 0.987 0.878 0.942 
F-Statistic 112.421 145.317 86.892 161.465 18.392 41.722 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of high school seniors who consider binge drinking a great risk. 
 
b Regression based on a subsample of high school seniors who do not consider binge drinking a great risk. 
 
c Price elasticities are evaluated at the mean values. 
 




Table 15 - Excessive Alcohol Consumption OLS Regressions, Male High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 
  Binging Binging Binging Binging Binging Binging 
       
Real Price -0.801*** -0.517***  -0.417*** -0.203 -0.279* 
 [0.103] [0.071]  [0.090] [0.241] [0.140] 
Time -2.747*** 0.632 2.355*** 0.709 1.032 1.173 
 [0.417] [0.754] [0.625] [0.590] [1.404] [0.865] 
Time squared 0.078*** -0.004 -0.081*** -0.015 -0.081* -0.022 
 [0.025] [0.022] [0.021] [0.020] [0.046] [0.040] 
Time cubed -0.001** -0.001* 0.001** -0.000 0.001* -0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
Risk   -0.454*** -0.251**   
   [0.082] [0.107]   
Legal Age  -6.918*** -5.298*** -5.211*** -1.247 -6.679*** 
  [0.547] [1.481] [0.861] [2.761] [1.852] 
Real Income  0.088* 0.121 0.063 0.035 -0.007 
  [0.048] [0.094] [0.040] [0.128] [0.091] 
Father's Education  -0.590** -0.262 -0.402** 0.284 0.112 
  [0.229] [0.257] [0.194] [0.215] [0.191] 
Mother's Education  0.752*** 0.467* 0.625*** -0.399 -0.111 
  [0.214] [0.242] [0.184] [0.268] [0.128] 
Mother's Employment  -0.585*** -0.566*** -0.588*** -0.055 -0.428** 
  [0.164] [0.154] [0.148] [0.188] [0.195] 
       
Price Elasticityc -1.914 -1.236  -0.996 -1.012 -0.510 
Income Elasticityd  0.116 0.160 0.083 0.092 -0.007 
R-sq 0.953 0.988 0.982 0.991 0.865 0.942 
F-Statistic 143.039 211.892 139.541 233.877 16.420 41.764 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of male high school seniors who consider binge drinking a great risk. 
 
b Regression based on a subsample of male high school seniors who do not consider binge drinking a great 
risk. 
 
c Price elasticities are evaluated at the mean values. 
 




Table 16 - Excessive Alcohol Consumption OLS Regressions, Female High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 
  Binging Binging Binging Binging Binging Binging 
       
Real Price -0.692*** -0.501***  -0.455*** -0.310** -0.385 
 [0.074] [0.039]  [0.061] [0.150] [0.243] 
Time -1.582*** 0.194 1.831*** 0.241 0.789 0.295 
 [0.396] [0.306] [0.434] [0.290] [0.831] [1.824] 
Time squared 0.030 -0.006 -0.091*** -0.012 -0.048 -0.036 
 [0.023] [0.017] [0.018] [0.014] [0.029] [0.062] 
Time cubed -0.000 -0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
Risk   -0.247* -0.150   
   [0.142] [0.100]   
Legal Age  -5.400*** -5.282*** -4.628*** -3.867*** -4.308** 
  [0.744] [1.520] [0.676] [1.225] [1.649] 
Real Income  0.081 0.122 0.012 0.018 0.273 
  [0.076] [0.149] [0.088] [0.089] [0.167] 
Father's Education  -0.047 -0.229 -0.022 0.106 0.041 
  [0.240] [0.281] [0.246] [0.179] [0.301] 
Mother's Education  0.255 0.382 0.279 0.102 0.049 
  [0.268] [0.373] [0.262] [0.159] [0.260] 
Mother's Employment  -0.252 -0.014 -0.252 -0.071 0.033 
  [0.195] [0.212] [0.186] [0.140] [0.279] 
       
Price Elasticityc -2.665 -1.927  -1.752 -2.222 -0.977 
Income Elasticityd  0.144 0.216 0.022 0.058 0.331 
R-sq 0.874 0.948 0.919 0.954 0.735 0.773 
F-Statistic 48.625 46.990 29.008 45.387 7.081 8.688 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of female high school seniors who consider binge drinking a great risk. 
 
b Regression based on a subsample of female high school seniors who do not consider binge drinking a great 
risk. 
 
c Price elasticities are evaluated at the mean values. 
 




Table 17 - Excessive Alcohol Consumption OLS Regressions, White High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 
  Binging Binging Binging Binging Binging Binging 
       
Real Price -0.879*** -0.699***  -0.530*** -0.608*** -0.061 
 [0.091] [0.070]  [0.127] [0.131] [0.123] 
Time -2.207*** 0.385 1.890*** 0.418 -0.019 2.428*** 
 [0.410] [0.774] [0.472] [0.589] [0.746] [0.862] 
Time squared 0.055** 0.001 -0.078*** -0.005 -0.035 -0.044 
 [0.025] [0.026] [0.024] [0.021] [0.039] [0.032] 
Time cubed -0.001 -0.001 0.001* -0.000 0.001 0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
Risk   -0.549*** -0.259**   
   [0.109] [0.108]   
Legal Age  -6.457*** -4.494* -5.131*** -1.942 -7.274*** 
  [0.766] [2.187] [0.865] [1.692] [1.889] 
Real Income  0.071 0.020 0.000 -0.035 -0.049 
  [0.066] [0.098] [0.050] [0.093] [0.081] 
Father's Education  -0.580** -0.071 -0.328 0.212 -0.007 
  [0.245] [0.280] [0.209] [0.129] [0.214] 
Mother's Education  0.806*** 0.158 0.561** -0.060 0.052 
  [0.243] [0.442] [0.270] [0.169] [0.150] 
Mother's Employment  -0.548** -0.133 -0.445** -0.083 -0.715*** 
  [0.232] [0.181] [0.200] [0.147] [0.173] 
       
Price Elasticityc -2.328 -1.851  -1.404 -3.366 -0.118 
Income Elasticityd  0.095 0.026 0.000 -0.092 -0.050 
R-sq 0.913 0.972 0.958 0.977 0.849 0.919 
F-Statistic 73.833 88.751 58.817 95.401 14.395 29.025 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of white high school seniors who consider binge drinking a great risk. 
 
b Regression based on a subsample of white high school seniors who do not consider binge drinking a great 
risk. 
 
c Price elasticities are evaluated at the mean values. 
 




Table 18 - Excessive Alcohol Consumption OLS Regressions, Nonwhite High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 
  Binging Binging Binging Binging Binging Binging 
       
Real Price -0.029 -0.005  -0.025 0.158 -0.186 
 [0.101] [0.114]  [0.120] [0.168] [0.453] 
Time 0.123 1.046 1.102** 1.007 0.897 1.685 
 [0.447] [0.677] [0.423] [0.726] [0.724] [1.635] 
Time squared -0.047* -0.063** -0.065*** -0.062** -0.030 -0.139* 
 [0.025] [0.024] [0.016] [0.026] [0.026] [0.079] 
Time cubed 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 0.003* 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
Risk   -0.092 -0.095   
   [0.129] [0.129]   
Legal Age  -0.556 -0.334 -0.201 -3.986 1.370 
  [1.689] [1.262] [1.473] [2.506] [3.377] 
Real Income  0.085 0.087 0.080 -0.053 0.052 
  [0.092] [0.088] [0.103] [0.104] [0.129] 
Father's Education  0.194 0.175 0.172 0.004 0.179 
  [0.149] [0.164] [0.162] [0.107] [0.126] 
Mother's Education  -0.050 -0.063 -0.057 0.059 -0.129 
  [0.218] [0.227] [0.222] [0.147] [0.151] 
Mother's Employment  -0.459** -0.403** -0.404** -0.201 -0.171 
  [0.184] [0.191] [0.193] [0.135] [0.234] 
       
Price Elasticityc -0.189 -0.031  -0.160 1.595 -0.756 
Income Elasticityd  0.287 0.293 0.270 -0.277 0.113 
R-sq 0.647 0.762 0.768 0.768 0.588 0.274 
F-Statistic 12.818 8.193 8.437 7.271 3.645 0.965 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of nonwhite high school seniors who consider binge drinking a great risk. 
 
b Regression based on a subsample of nonwhite high school seniors who do not consider binge drinking a 
great risk. 
 
c Price elasticities are evaluated at the mean values. 
 




Table 19 - Cigarette Consumption Double Log Regressions, High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 











       LN Real Price -0.495*** -0.486***  -0.400** -0.622*** -0.265* 
 [0.130] [0.133]  [0.164] [0.136] [0.143] Time -0.126*** -0.140*** -0.053 -0.099*** -0.114*** -0.092*** 
 [0.011] [0.020] [0.045] [0.026] [0.020] [0.017] Time Squared 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] Time Cubed -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Risk   -0.024*** -0.011*   
   [0.008] [0.006]   LN Real Income  0.310*** 0.567** 0.443*** 0.532** 0.244* 
  [0.063] [0.208] [0.115] [0.242] [0.125] Father's Education  0.020 0.001 0.008 -0.016 0.006 
  [0.013] [0.023] [0.014] [0.013] [0.004] Mother's Education  -0.023* 0.005 -0.009 0.015 -0.003 
  [0.011] [0.018] [0.011] [0.011] [0.007] Mother's Employment  0.021** 0.001 0.011 -0.006 0.004 
  [0.008] [0.013] [0.007] [0.009] [0.008] 
       R-sq 0.920 0.943 0.918 0.949 0.878 0.719 
F-Statistic 80.559 49.761 33.477 47.176 21.621 7.689 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of high school seniors who consider smoking a great risk. 
 




Table 20 - Cigarette Consumption Double Log Regressions, Male High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 











       LN Real Price -0.425** -0.417**  -0.394** -0.677*** -0.311** 
 [0.167] [0.152]  [0.162] [0.213] [0.120] Time -0.139*** -0.192*** -0.134** -0.172*** -0.123*** -0.126*** 
 [0.013] [0.021] [0.052] [0.031] [0.038] [0.022] Time Squared 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] Time Cubed -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Risk   -0.009* -0.003   
   [0.005] [0.005]   LN Real Income  0.099 0.279 0.191 0.504** 0.175 
  [0.137] [0.264] [0.211] [0.240] [0.177] Father's Education  0.031*** 0.026 0.028** -0.011 0.004 
  [0.010] [0.018] [0.013] [0.015] [0.003] Mother's Education  -0.026*** -0.015 -0.022** 0.006 0.001 
  [0.009] [0.012] [0.010] [0.015] [0.005] Mother's Employment  0.028*** 0.013 0.024** 0.005 0.005 
  [0.010] [0.017] [0.010] [0.006] [0.006] 
       R-sq 0.873 0.908 0.869 0.910 0.682 0.718 
F-Statistic 47.986 29.739 19.958 25.751 6.434 7.624 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of male high school seniors who consider smoking a great risk. 
 




Table 21 - Cigarette Consumption Double Log Regressions, Female High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 











       LN Real Price -0.551*** -0.545***  -0.405*** -0.558*** -0.383* 
 [0.123] [0.121]  [0.140] [0.101] [0.193] Time -0.114*** -0.093*** -0.038 -0.058** -0.113*** -0.047*** 
 [0.015] [0.019] [0.023] [0.027] [0.012] [0.015] Time Squared 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.004** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] Time Cubed -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Risk   -0.024*** -0.015**   
   [0.005] [0.006]   LN Real Income  0.492*** 0.496*** 0.492*** 0.660** 0.193 
  [0.090] [0.124] [0.083] [0.273] [0.135] Father's Education  -0.008 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.000 
  [0.011] [0.017] [0.012] [0.009] [0.005] Mother's Education  -0.001 0.010 0.004 0.006 -0.002 
  [0.013] [0.016] [0.014] [0.006] [0.005] Mother's Employment  0.009 -0.002 -0.000 -0.006 -0.004 
  [0.010] [0.009] [0.011] [0.009] [0.004] 
       R-sq 0.918 0.944 0.933 0.956 0.918 0.544 
F-Statistic 78.346 50.591 41.790 55.151 33.402 3.581 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of female high school seniors who consider smoking a great risk. 
 




Table 22 - Cigarette Consumption Double Log Regressions, White High School Seniors 















       LN Real Price -0.487*** -0.479***  -0.319 -0.580*** -0.297** 
 [0.148] [0.156]  [0.187] [0.163] [0.134] Time -0.113*** -0.123*** -0.035 -0.073** -0.092*** -0.073*** 
 [0.011] [0.023] [0.035] [0.027] [0.021] [0.014] Time Squared 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] Time Cubed -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Risk   -0.023*** -0.013*   
   [0.006] [0.007]   LN Real Income  0.191* 0.452** 0.354** 0.665*** 0.151 
  [0.100] [0.164] [0.131] [0.228] [0.149] Father's Education  0.011 -0.002 0.002 -0.005 0.002 
  [0.013] [0.015] [0.013] [0.009] [0.003] Mother's Education  -0.007 0.011 0.004 0.011 -0.004 
  [0.011] [0.015] [0.012] [0.008] [0.005] Mother's Employment  0.009 -0.011 -0.002 -0.011 0.002 
  [0.011] [0.013] [0.008] [0.010] [0.003] 
       R-sq 0.883 0.897 0.890 0.912 0.886 0.653 
F-Statistic 52.661 26.122 24.204 26.459 23.430 5.646 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of white high school seniors who consider smoking a great risk. 
 




Table 23 - Cigarette Consumption Double Log Regressions, Nonwhite High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 











       LN Real Price -1.168*** -1.101***  -1.011*** -1.048** -0.973* 
 [0.254] [0.222]  [0.224] [0.484] [0.547] Time -0.231*** -0.190*** -0.094*** -0.163*** -0.241*** -0.180*** 
 [0.028] [0.020] [0.032] [0.027] [0.055] [0.052] Time Squared 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.004* 0.010*** 0.012** 0.010** 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.004] Time Cubed -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Risk   -0.019*** -0.010**   
   [0.005] [0.004]   LN Real Income  0.718* 0.971 0.831* 0.661 0.378 
  [0.392] [0.575] [0.437] [0.720] [0.326] Father's Education  0.007 0.016 0.009 0.010 0.017 
  [0.021] [0.022] [0.020] [0.015] [0.011] Mother's Education  -0.016 -0.010 -0.016 -0.003 -0.029*** 
  [0.018] [0.020] [0.017] [0.013] [0.007] Mother's 
Employment  -0.010 -0.025** -0.010 -0.010 0.010 
  [0.008] [0.011] [0.007] [0.011] [0.014] 
       R-sq 0.916 0.935 0.900 0.939 0.762 0.583 
F-Statistic 76.248 43.335 27.023 39.388 9.619 4.201 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of nonwhite high school seniors who consider smoking a great risk. 
 




Table 24 - Alcohol Consumption Double Log Regressions, High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 
 LN LN LN LN LN LN   Drinking Drinking Drinking Drinking Drinking Drinking 
       LN Real Price -0.574*** -0.372***  -0.354*** -0.262 -0.270*** 
 [0.118] [0.118]  [0.100] [0.507] [0.087] Time -0.010 0.028** 0.048*** 0.031*** 0.047* 0.002 
 [0.006] [0.010] [0.008] [0.010] [0.023] [0.008] Time Squared -0.000 -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001* 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] Time Cubed 0.000 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Risk   -0.004** -0.004*   
   [0.002] [0.002]   Legal Age  0.000 0.034 0.040* -0.022 0.010 
  [0.017] [0.026] [0.020] [0.060] [0.011] LN Real Income  0.180** 0.259*** 0.174*** 0.115 0.119 
  [0.065] [0.062] [0.060] [0.116] [0.072] Father's Education  -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.004 -0.004 
  [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.003] Mother's Education  0.017*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.002 0.004*** 
  [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.001] Mother's Employment  -0.009** -0.008* -0.010** -0.009** -0.001 
  [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] 
       R-sq 0.969 0.986 0.985 0.989 0.948 0.980 
F-Statistic 217.022 180.272 170.508 189.913 46.220 122.795 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of high school seniors who consider drinking a great risk. 
 




Table 25 - Alcohol Consumption Double Log Regressions, Male High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 
 LN LN LN LN LN LN   Drinking Drinking Drinking Drinking Drinking Drinking 
       LN Real Price -0.648*** -0.419***  -0.412*** -0.227 -0.521*** 
 [0.115] [0.111]  [0.117] [0.861] [0.112] Time -0.018*** 0.027* 0.052*** 0.028* 0.054 -0.010 
 [0.006] [0.013] [0.012] [0.014] [0.041] [0.011] Time Squared 0.000 -0.001* -0.002*** -0.001* -0.003* 0.000 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.000] Time Cubed -0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Risk   -0.002 -0.002   
   [0.003] [0.003]   Legal Age  -0.006 -0.002 0.009 -0.068 0.002 
  [0.018] [0.038] [0.027] [0.055] [0.012] LN Real Income  0.177** 0.269*** 0.173** 0.190 0.097 
  [0.066] [0.089] [0.062] [0.193] [0.081] Father's Education  -0.013*** -0.014** -0.012** -0.005 -0.001 
  [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.002] Mother's Education  0.009*** 0.008** 0.009** -0.003 0.002 
  [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.006] [0.002] Mother's Employment  -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.002 -0.001 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] 
       R-sq 0.969 0.981 0.977 0.982 0.926 0.956 
F-Statistic 218.287 134.030 107.655 118.530 32.025 55.646 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of male high school seniors who consider drinking a great risk. 
 




Table 26 - Alcohol Consumption Double Log Regressions, Female High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 











       LN Real Price -0.471*** -0.290  -0.326* -0.179 0.045 
 [0.130] [0.213]  [0.185] [0.450] [0.143] Time -0.002 0.019 0.032*** 0.021* 0.016 0.016* 
 [0.007] [0.013] [0.008] [0.012] [0.021] [0.008] Time Squared -0.001 -0.001* -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002** -0.001*** 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] Time Cubed 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Risk   -0.003** -0.003**  
   [0.001] [0.001]   Legal Age  -0.009 0.023 0.034 -0.021 0.014 
  [0.019] [0.025] [0.020] [0.062] [0.014] LN Real Income  0.154 0.191*** 0.126 0.049 0.152* 
  [0.090] [0.066] [0.078] [0.106] [0.074] Father's Education  -0.010* -0.012* -0.010* -0.003 -0.005** 
  [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.004] [0.002] Mother's Education  0.011** 0.010* 0.010** 0.007* 0.003 
  [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] Mother's Employment  -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 -0.000 -0.000 
  [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] 
       R-sq 0.957 0.971 0.972 0.975 0.920 0.958 
F-Statistic 156.379 86.748 89.672 86.547 29.440 58.661 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of female high school seniors who consider drinking a great risk. 
 




Table 27 - Alcohol Consumption Double Log Regressions, White High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 











       LN Real Price -0.556*** -0.308**  -0.305*** -0.349 -0.242** 
 [0.123] [0.131]  [0.101] [0.500] [0.117] Time -0.005 0.038*** 0.056*** 0.041*** 0.058* 0.004 
 [0.006] [0.013] [0.009] [0.012] [0.034] [0.009] Time Squared -0.000 -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.004** -0.001 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.002] [0.000] Time Cubed 0.000 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Risk   -0.005* -0.005*   
   [0.002] [0.003]   Legal Age  0.009 0.059* 0.061** 0.042 -0.000 
  [0.023] [0.030] [0.025] [0.072] [0.015] LN Real Income  0.233** 0.268*** 0.202*** 0.183 0.112 
  [0.091] [0.071] [0.068] [0.131] [0.085] Father's Education  -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.007 -0.003 
  [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.002] Mother's Education  0.011** 0.009* 0.010** 0.001 0.004*** 
  [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.001] Mother's Employment  -0.008** -0.009** -0.011** -0.006 -0.002 
  [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.002] 
       R-sq 0.952 0.977 0.979 0.982 0.932 0.968 
F-Statistic 138.578 106.975 119.216 118.229 35.139 77.226 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of white high school seniors who consider drinking a great risk. 
 




Table 28 - Alcohol Consumption Double Log Regressions, Nonwhite High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 











       LN Real Price 0.099 0.000  -0.025 0.370 -0.180 
 [0.170] [0.342]  [0.323] [0.789] [0.523] Time 0.009 0.013 0.011* 0.010 -0.005 -0.005 
 [0.006] [0.013] [0.006] [0.012] [0.038] [0.020] Time Squared -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001 -0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] Time Cubed 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Risk   -0.001 -0.001   
   [0.001] [0.001]   Legal Age  -0.001 0.014 0.016 -0.015 0.032 
  [0.030] [0.019] [0.023] [0.086] [0.047] LN Real Income  0.018 0.029 0.025 -0.128 0.176 
  [0.098] [0.072] [0.102] [0.188] [0.109] Father's Education  0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.004 0.006** 
  [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.007] [0.002] Mother's Education  -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 0.007 -0.006** 
  [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.004] [0.003] Mother's Employment  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 
  [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
       R-sq 0.922 0.938 0.941 0.941 0.690 0.687 
F-Statistic 82.403 38.945 40.573 34.943 5.682 5.598 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of nonwhite high school seniors who consider drinking a great risk. 
 




Table 29 - Excessive Alcohol Consumption Double Log Regressions, High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 











       LN Real Price -2.312*** -1.735*** 
 
-1.449*** -1.662** -0.610* 
 [0.295] [0.209]  
[0.326] [0.751] [0.303] 
Time -0.064*** 0.012 0.057*** 0.010 0.041 0.008 
 [0.013] [0.018] [0.017] [0.013] [0.044] [0.025] Time squared 0.002** -0.000 -0.003*** -0.000 -0.003 -0.000 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] Time cubed -0.000* -0.000 0.000** -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Risk 
  
-0.014*** -0.007** 
     
[0.004] [0.003] 
  Legal Age 
 
-0.161*** -0.119** -0.122*** -0.091 -0.147*** 
  
[0.018] [0.052] [0.020] [0.094] [0.024] 
LN Real Income 
 
0.142 0.170 0.028 0.319 -0.084 
  
[0.086] [0.199] [0.079] [0.400] [0.116] 
Father's Education 
 
-0.019** -0.008 -0.013* 0.008 0.008 
  
[0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.013] [0.005] 
Mother's Education 
 
0.024*** 0.012 0.020** -0.017 0.002 
  
[0.008] [0.012] [0.009] [0.013] [0.002] 
Mother's Employment 
 
-0.017** -0.006 -0.014** 0.003 -0.009* 
  
[0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.005] 
       R-sq 0.937 0.980 0.967 0.984 0.866 0.934 
F-Statistic 104.685 127.782 74.819 136.750 16.555 35.887 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of high school seniors who consider binge drinking a great risk. 
 




Table 30 - Excessive Alcohol Consumption Double Log Regressions, Male High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 











       LN Real Price -1.930*** -1.225***  -0.987*** -0.325 -0.509 
 [0.283] [0.223]  [0.270] [1.361] [0.300] Time -0.064*** 0.024 0.064*** 0.024 0.096 0.021 
 [0.012] [0.022] [0.016] [0.017] [0.070] [0.018] Time squared 0.002*** -0.000 -0.002*** -0.000 -0.006** -0.000 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] Time cubed -0.000** -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 0.000* -0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Risk   -0.011*** -0.007**   
   [0.002] [0.003]   Legal Age  -0.161*** -0.115*** -0.114*** -0.056 -0.122*** 
  [0.015] [0.039] [0.025] [0.128] [0.034] LN Real Income  0.178** 0.257 0.128* 0.422 -0.040 
  [0.082] [0.161] [0.064] [0.444] [0.124] Father's Education  -0.017** -0.009 -0.012** 0.014 0.003 
  [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.013] [0.004] Mother's Education  0.019*** 0.011* 0.015*** -0.022 -0.002 
  [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.016] [0.003] Mother's Employment  -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.005 -0.008** 
  [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.011] [0.004] 
       R-sq 0.950 0.985 0.980 0.988 0.862 0.938 
F-Statistic 132.652 164.580 124.885 178.324 15.985 38.434 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of male high school seniors who consider binge drinking a great risk. 
 





Table 31 - Excessive Alcohol Consumption Double Log Regressions, Female High School Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 











       LN Real Price -2.800*** -2.113***  -1.968*** -3.012** -1.047 
 [0.352] [0.213]  [0.290] [1.140] [0.645] Time -0.061*** 0.007 0.071*** 0.007 0.026 0.009 
 [0.017] [0.013] [0.019] [0.011] [0.059] [0.048] Time squared 0.001 -0.000 -0.004*** -0.000 -0.003 -0.001 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] Time cubed -0.000 -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Risk   -0.009 -0.006   
   [0.006] [0.004]   Legal Age  -0.207*** -0.198*** -0.175*** -0.243** -0.102** 
  [0.029] [0.063] [0.028] [0.088] [0.043] LN Real Income  0.178 0.307 0.037 0.052 0.416* 
  [0.149] [0.323] [0.185] [0.300] [0.230] Father's Education  -0.004 -0.012 -0.003 0.012 0.001 
  [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.013] [0.008] Mother's Education  0.013 0.019 0.015 0.005 0.001 
  [0.011] [0.015] [0.011] [0.013] [0.007] Mother's Employment  -0.012 -0.001 -0.012 -0.003 0.001 
  [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.010] [0.008] 
       R-sq 0.862 0.942 0.905 0.947 0.717 0.763 
F-Statistic 43.874 41.383 24.426 39.473 6.485 8.226 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of female high school seniors who consider binge drinking a great risk. 
 





Table 32 - Excessive Alcohol Consumption Double Log Regressions, White High School Seniors 















       LN Real Price -2.372*** -1.851***  -1.462*** -3.719*** -0.095 
 [0.280] [0.246]  [0.418] [0.827] [0.245] Time -0.058*** 0.019 0.055*** 0.016 -0.007 0.049** 
 [0.012] [0.022] [0.015] [0.018] [0.048] [0.018] Time squared 0.001** -0.000 -0.002*** -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] Time cubed -0.000 -0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Risk   -0.014*** -0.007*   
   [0.003] [0.003]   Legal Age  -0.167*** -0.110* -0.132*** -0.076 -0.143*** 
  [0.019] [0.063] [0.026] [0.103] [0.038] LN Real Income  0.170 0.114 0.056 0.032 -0.054 
  [0.107] [0.186] [0.088] [0.266] [0.103] Father's Education  -0.018** -0.005 -0.012* 0.012 -0.000 
  [0.007] [0.008] [0.006] [0.008] [0.004] Mother's Education  0.023*** 0.007 0.017** -0.004 0.001 
  [0.007] [0.013] [0.008] [0.011] [0.003] Mother's Employment  -0.016** -0.004 -0.013** -0.005 -0.015*** 
  [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.010] [0.003] 
       R-sq 0.907 0.969 0.953 0.974 0.815 0.913 
F-Statistic 67.990 80.728 52.375 83.094 11.230 26.916 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown.  
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of white high school seniors who consider binge drinking a great risk. 
 





Table 33 - Excessive Alcohol Consumption Double Log Regressions, Nonwhite High School 
Seniors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)a (6)b 











       LN Real Price -0.166 -0.011  -0.152 3.664 -0.544 
 [0.756] [0.871]  [0.930] [2.595] [2.290] Time 0.018 0.086 0.089*** 0.084 0.229* 0.087 
 [0.032] [0.051] [0.031] [0.055] [0.117] [0.071] Time squared -0.004** -0.005** -0.005*** -0.005** -0.008* -0.007* 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003] Time cubed 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000 0.000* 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Risk   -0.006 -0.006   
   [0.009] [0.009]   Legal Age  -0.034 -0.017 -0.010 -0.712 0.092 
  [0.121] [0.089] [0.105] [0.468] [0.149] LN Real Income  0.302 0.308 0.284 -0.840 0.206 
  [0.361] [0.326] [0.402] [0.867] [0.331] Father's Education  0.012 0.010 0.010 -0.011 0.011 
  [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.017] [0.006] Mother's Education  0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.019 -0.009 
  [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.020] [0.008] Mother's Employment  -0.035*** -0.032** -0.032** -0.028 -0.009 
  [0.012] [0.013] [0.013] [0.017] [0.012] 
       R-sq 0.620 0.750 0.755 0.755 0.431 0.331 
F-Statistic 11.443 7.654 7.868 6.779 1.935 1.263 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note: Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are given in brackets. Intercepts are not shown. 
                                                 
a Regression based on a subsample of nonwhite high school seniors who consider binge drinking a great risk. 
 





Table 34 - Predicted Change in Cigarette Consumption 
Panel A: change in consumption predicted by the model between 1992-1997 
Observed change in smoking among high school seniors = 8.94 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Real Price 1.16 1.16  1.03 1.00 0.72 Risk   0.13 0.05   Observed change in smoking  among male high school seniors = 8.05 
Real Price 1.16 1.16  1.11 1.27 1.00 Risk   0.22 0.10   Observed change in smoking  among female high school seniors = 9.45 
Real Price 1.12 1.16  0.91 0.86 1.03 Risk   0.05 0.03   Observed change in smoking  among white high school seniors = 10.71 
Real Price 1.36 1.40  1.16 1.05 1.09 Risk   1.10 0.39   Observed change in smoking  among nonwhite high school seniors = 6.82 
Real Price 0.89 0.86  0.73 0.64 0.84 Risk   0.46 0.27                 
Panel B: change in consumption predicted by the model between 1997-2008 
Observed change in smoking among high school seniors= -16.14 
Real Price -11.62 -11.72  -10.31 -10.03 -7.22 Risk   -4.35 -1.57   Observed change in smoking among male high school seniors = -15.80 
Real Price -11.72 -11.62  -11.15 -12.75 -10.03 Risk   -1.71 -0.76   Observed change in smoking among female high school seniors = -16.05 
Real Price -11.25 -11.72  -9.19 -8.62 -10.31 Risk   -4.41 -2.18   Observed change in smoking among white high school seniors = -18.18 
Real Price -13.69 -14.06  -11.62 -10.59 -10.97 Risk   -5.65 -1.98   Observed change in smoking among nonwhite high school seniors = -1.96 
Real Price -9.00 -8.62  -7.31 -6.47 -8.44 Risk   -1.72 -1.02                 
 
Note: Predicted changes in cigarette consumption in columns 5 and 6 are based on high school 
seniors that consider smoking a great risk and those who do not, respectively. This applies for the 




Table 35 - Predicted Change in Alcohol Consumption 
Change in consumption predicted by the model between 1989-1992 
Observed change in drinking among high school seniors = -5.95 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Real Price -2.20 -1.67  -1.55 -1.15 -1.31 Risk   -0.66 -0.59   Observed change in drinking among male high school seniors = -6.48 
Real Price -2.50 -1.89  -1.84 -0.71 -2.37 Risk   -0.20 -0.15   Observed change in drinking among female high school seniors = -5.15 
Real Price -1.81 -1.24  -1.35 -0.94 0.07 Risk   -0.64 -0.69   Observed change in drinking among white high school seniors = -6.79 
Real Price -2.23 -1.64  -1.53 -1.36 -1.18 Risk   -0.85 -0.81   Observed change in drinking among nonwhite high school seniors = -3.50 
Real Price 0.23 0.00  -0.09 0.96 -0.56 Risk   -0.45 -0.45                 
 
Note: Predicted changes in alcohol consumption in columns 5 and 6 are based on high school 
seniors that consider drinking a great risk and those who do not, respectively. This applies for the 




Table 36 - Predicted Change in Excessive Alcohol Consumption 
Change in consumption predicted by the model between 1989-1992 
Observed change in binge drinking among high school seniors = -5.34 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Real Price -5.09 -3.75  -3.01 -1.94 -1.83 Risk   -2.81 -1.43   Observed change in binge drinking among male high school seniors = -5.86 
Real Price -5.32 -3.44  -2.77 -1.35 -1.85 Risk   -1.43 -0.79   Observed change in binge drinking among female high school seniors = -4.81 
Real Price -4.60 -3.33  -3.02 -2.06 -2.56 Risk   -2.03 -1.24   Observed change in binge drinking among white high school seniors = -5.76 
Real Price -5.84 -4.65  -3.52 -4.04 -0.41 Risk   -4.08 -1.92   Observed change in binge drinking among nonwhite high school seniors = -6.20 
Real Price -0.19 -0.03  -0.17 -1.05 -1.24 Risk   -0.44 -0.46                 
 
Note: Predicted changes in excessive alcohol consumption in columns 5 and 6 are based on high 
school seniors that consider binge drinking a great risk and those who do not, respectively. This 







Figure 1 - Real Cigarette and Alcohol Prices, 1976-2008 
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Figure 2 - Participation Rates for Smoking, Drinking, and Binge Drinking Among High School Seniors, 1976-2008 


















































































Figure 3 - Percentage of High School Seniors Who Consider Smoking, Drinking, or Binge Drinking a Great Risk, 1976-2008 
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 A harmful good has a full price 𝜋 such as: 
𝜋 = 𝑝 + ℎ 
where 𝑝 is the money price and ℎ is the expected monetary value of the harm associated with the 
consumption of this harmful good. Then, the demand function for this harmful good is 
𝑥 = 𝑓(𝜋) 
= 𝑓(𝑝 + ℎ) 






































where 𝑝 (𝑝 + ℎ)⁄  is the share of money price with respect to the full price of the good (let’s call it 𝑘). 
Then, if ℎ is held constant, 𝜕(𝑝 + ℎ) 𝜕𝑝⁄ = 1, so 
𝑒 = 𝜀𝑘 
If 𝜀 is independent of 𝑥, an increase in 𝑘 will increase 𝑒 in absolute value. In other words, 




on the amount consumed, consumers that ignore or strongly underestimate the harm associated 
with the consumption of a harmful good will have a more elastic demand function. 
Assuming a demand function for a harmful good with the following specification: 
ln 𝑥 =  𝛼 + 𝜀 ln𝜋 
=  𝛼 + 𝜀 ln(𝑝 + ℎ) 
=  𝛼 + 𝜀(ln(𝑝 + ℎ) + ln𝑝 − ln 𝑝) 
=  𝛼 + 𝜀 ln
𝑝 + ℎ
𝑝
+ 𝜀 ln𝑝 
where 𝜀 is less than 0 and the price elasticity of demand for 𝑥 with respect to 𝜋. Since proxies for ℎ 
are imperfect or not usually available, estimating ln 𝑥 while omitting ℎ (and therefore making 
ln((𝑝 + ℎ) 𝑝⁄ ) equal to 0) yields 
ln 𝑥 =  𝑎 + 𝑏 ln𝑝 
According to omitted variable formula, the expected value of 𝑏 is 
𝐸(𝑏) = 𝜀 + 𝜀𝑐 




= 𝑐 ln 𝑝 
Then, 
𝑐 ≡
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Since 𝑘 = 𝑝 (𝑝 + ℎ)⁄ : 
𝑐 =







= 𝑘 − 1 
Then, 














If ℎ = 0 due to unreliable proxies for the expected monetary value of the harm associated 
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